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REPORT

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

CAUSES OF ITS INACTION AND ILL SUCCESS.

ITS SEVERAL CAMPAIGNS.

WHY M'CLELLAN WAS REMOVED.

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

REMOVAL OF BURNSIDE.

NEW YORK:
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1863.

REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR:

Mr. Wad', from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the Wer, submitted the following toport, with the accompanying testimous :

CONDUCT OF THE WAY.

In December, I'll, a jilse. A masef the two nouses of Corresponding to the Communities of the London did in not. The film House of Reportative year against the Monte of Reportative year against the Monte of the dis-

intally you applied the position is a construct of elemental the position with the Color of the red with the position of the red with the position of the large red to provide the color of the red to the

The transmission of the statement of the

of the control of the in there rathe. The some Congress fresh from their constitues is. I drawin met. and there could be to doubt that he trey had before acted ac would they continue to not. It nears but to refer to the history of the Congress just closed, its prompt and thorough schon; cothing the Executive with the falsest power, placing at his disposal all the resources of men and money which this nation possessed, to prove that your Committee judged rightly that Conprove that

gress needed no prompting from them to do its en-

the duty. .

Let up a thore whose duty it was to provide the

Retagn these whose duty it was to provide the means accessary to jut down the Red Bios, but upon those whose duty it was to highwally apply the among a retain the provide and the first they employ a relative to the provide and the first that they are defined and the retained and the relative to the first they will be in the transported from the retained the relative to the feet of the analysis and the control of form the control of the relative entrol of the relative provides and the control of the relative provides and the relative the control of the relative provides and the relative the control of the relative provides and the relative the rela

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The field.

That white each of those subjects has received for them the uttention vehicle has importance in them the uttention vehicle has importance in the formattey were able to give in the attention of your Committee has been turned more in the vehicle to the theory of the Army of the Potonial in the telephony of that army into beform that the man in the conduct of the west. That that aimy fill add all that a generous and confiding people were in the conduct of the west. That the head all that a generous and confiding people were in the conduct of the west. The of the single of the conduct of the west. The of the of the time had not the these local confidence in the filles have of the contest to the present time, with all a confidence of the analysis of the contest to the present time, with all a confidence of the a. Consent the present time, with all a confidence of the a. Consent the contest to the present time, with all a confidence of the all and the contest to the present time, with all a confidence of the all all the confidence of the contest to the present time. The following the contest to the present time, with all a confidence of the would otherwise have been reaped from our glorious victories in the West. from our glorious victories in the West.

Trerefore, while your Committee have not failed to take the testimony of witnesses in relation to milalso upon various subjects to which their attention has been specially cirected by Congress and the War Department since the Committee was first appointed, the principal part of the testimony taken

11:

by them relates to the Army of the Potemin and those subjects more in used trely countries d with its operations. Tony tave taken the testimony of nearly 200 witnesses, almost entirely men in the militure service of the Government, including about 100

generals.

The disaster at Bell Run in July, 1°61, was fully investigated by your Committee, as being the first conflict of the national troops with armed treason upon the field of battle; and also because the troops there engaged formed the nucleus around which has since been e-llected the vass and magnificent Army of the Potonnic. The result of their investigation your Committee submit in a separate report.

Your Committee have also investigated the disaster at Bail's Blaff, that battle being the first conflict of any extent in which any of t'e troops of the army of the Potomac were engaged after its re-organization. A separate report of that disaster is also sub-

mitted.

Immediately upon the organization of your Committee, and before proceeding to the taking of any testimony, they addressed to Gen. McCiellan, who, by the retirement of Gen. Scott, had become General-in-Chief of the Army, the following communication:

" WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 21, 1361. "Sin: You are aware that a Jourt Committee has been appointed by the renote and House of Perresentatives to inquire into the renote and House of Perresentatives to inquire into the renote and House of the war? Our Committee, at a meeting held this morning, maninensly express an desire, before proceeding in their official duties, to have eninterview with your to are morning at their optimization of the many suit your coare niewer, in view of your persing engagements.
"Our pies of meeting is uncroom of the Committee on Territorics of the Senste.
"I remain very rementfully, yours.

"Hensain, very respectfully, yours,
"Hensain, very respectfully, yours,
"McJ.-Gen. Cro. B. McClerlan, General Commanding
Army United States."

While fully appreciating the dignity and power with which they were clothed by the concurrent action of both louses of Cougress, they deemed it but just to award to his resitten the consideration of asking him to e ofer with them in relation to the best me had of fulfilling those expectations which the people had anyhit to hope for from an administration upon which they had, through their representatives, conferred such plenary powers. A reference to the journal of your committee will show that ill bealth prevented Gen. McClellan from immediately carrylying with this invitation. The necessities of the case, however, were to plessing and argent that your committee concluded to proceed at baco to the taking of testimony.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Soon after the hattle of Dull Run, in July, 1801, Gen. McDowell was enjurseded, and Gen. McClellan was call d by the President to the command of the army of the Promac. The compagn in Western Virginia, the credit of which had been generally ascribed to Gen. McCl Ila; the favor wich which it was understood ho was regarded by Gra. Scott, then general-m-chief of the range of the United States; even his comparative year h, hadden out the promise of active in linguouss a series and the promisera-tions tended to induce here into the public mind, and to remove the gloom and carpoid my which had followed the disastrous teens of the campaign just

Every energy of the Covernment and all the resource (faginer out) if the life however freely and la they fleed out and pend of Gen. McCleft at to enthel han to gather the star most for many and partition too most complete place of facionary, so that offensive operations might be resulted in dictincy, so that offensive operations might be resulted that the earliest practicallide moment. The Army of the Potomac became the object of special case to every department of the Government, and all offer military movements and organizations were measured organizations. to the one great purpose of college goat Washington, and organizing there, an army which should over-power the forees of the enemy, at d forever crush out any hope of success which the Rebels might cherish. Even when the army of

the Petoniac had alta hell di lousione never before contemplated in the course of military operations upon this continent, and sollow, if ever, or ided in modern times, no portion of its rapidly increasing numbers was permitted to be diverted, even for a brief period, to the accound shinout of other enterprises. The generals in that as of the variant expeditions from time to time intragrated, and from which so much benefit was anticipate — i.e., Butler, Gen. Sherman, Gen. Barnside, and others were compelled to look elsewhere for the troops to composa their commands, to rely upon the continued patriot in of the people, and the zerl of the Executives of the various States for the raising of those regiments which would enable them to depart for the fields of daty a signed to them. No consideration was for a noment allowed to diminish or impair the efficiency of the Army of the Potomac, and the unexample ferectacle was presented to other nations, who were intently watching the course of events in this country, of the largest tray of the present century being raised entirely by vola tary enlistments in the brief period of a few months.

When Congress assembled in this city, in the be-

ginning of December, 1861, so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and so zerlously had the people responded to their country's call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your Committee by the Adjutant General of the army, showed that, exclusive of the command of Gen. Dix, at Baltimere, the Army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men.

During the time this large army had been collecting and organizing, nothing of importance had transpired in connection with it, except the closing of the navigation of the Potome by the Releis, which your Committee tract of more at length in another art of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluff, which is made the sal ject of a separate report.

The weather during the Fall season, and for some weeks after the c uvening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for active military operations. As mouth after month passed without anything being done by the Army of the Potomac, the people tecame more and more anxious for the announcement that the work of propuration had been completed and active operations would seen be commenced.

From the testimony before your Commuttee it appeared that the Army of the Potomo was well armed and equipped, and had revehed a high state of discipling by the List of September or the first of October. The men were really and ea or to commence active operations. The generals in command. of the various divisions were opposed to going into winter quarters, and the me a of them declared they had no expectation of doing to.

CORPS ORGANIZATION.

In reference to the proper or or amization of so large un army as that about Washington, in order that it in army 63 that mode washington in error marking to the before able to act most eitherly in the field, the testimony of the winnesses examined upon that point in remaining manifests. The general result it. Therewith the stay of second to regar left to themselves the importance to division of the many into comparation of the many into comparation of the many into comparation of the total in the movements made my to rend renchan or animalou the most effective. Your Count, so deemed it is vially necessary that they represent the property of the attention of the authorities, at I used its induced to a state of the standards, it is get its induced to a standards in their power. The Problem at I the according of War emember of the induced to the standard but it is the standard of the standards of McCle.lan stated to your Committee, at the time of their conference with him, that, although it might at some time be expedient to givel the army into mmy corps, the sa ject was one of great difficulty. Ho sail it was a delicate matter to appoint major-generals before they had been tried by acrual service, and had shown their finners to

be selected to command 30,000 or 40,000 men. A major-general could not be stowed away in a pigeon-hole, if he should prove incompetent, so easily as a bigader-jeared. He proposed, therefore, to himself manage this entire army in some battle or campaign, and then select from the brigadier-generals in it such as provothemselves competent for higher commands. Consequently, the division of the army into army corps was not even began until after the movement of the army in March had commenced, and then only in pursuance of the direct and repented orders of the President. Gen. McClellan, however, continued to oppose the organization of the army into army corps, as

the organization of the triny into army corps, as will be seen from the following dispatch to him from the Secretary of War, date 1 May 9, 1862:

"The President's nawling to have the ermy corps organization broken up, but also unwilling that the communing ization broken up, but also unwilling that the commanding general shall be thosemed and embarased in actual sarmishing, collision with the enemy, and on the evo of an expected great buttle. A on, therefore, may temporarily suspend that organization in the army under your immediate command, and adopt any you see it, until further orders. He also writes you privately.

The provisional corps of Gen. Fitz-John Porter and Gen. Frankin wer) thereupon formed by reducing the other corps from three to two divisions.

STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY.

Your Committee endeavored to obtain as accurate information as possible in relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in December an order had been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any persons who should come into our lines from the direction of the enemy, but all such persons were to be sent, without examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the Generals examined appeared to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only such information as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters. As to the strength of the enemy's position, the general impression seemed to be founded upon information obtained from the same source, that it was exceedingly formidable. Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very greatly overestimated.

DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON.

Your Committee also sought to ascertain what number of men could be spared from this army for offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the force necessary to be Life in and around Washington to act entirely on the delensive, to render the capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as six: 11 y the witnesses examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men, leaving 100,000 or upward that could be used for expeditions at other points.

In connection with the same subject, your Committee inquired in reference to what had been done to render the fortifications here, which had been constructed at such expense and with so great labor, most effective for the defense of Washington. Your Committee are constrained to say that adequate provision never was made to properly man those fortifications and exercise man in the minasement of the guns. Several of the witnesses testified that they had repeatedly called the attention of the authorities to the matter, but without success. And when the movement of the army commenced in March, the few regiments that had been placed in the forts and partially instructed in the use of the gans, were almost entirely withdrawn, leaving the fortifications to be manned by raw and inexperienced

THE BLOCKADE OF THE POTOMAC.

The subject of the obstruction of the navigation of the Potomic naturally demanded the considera-tion of your Committee. Upon that point your Committee would call the attention of Congress to the testimony of Capt. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Upon reference to his testimony, it will appear that, in June, 1861, the Navy Department proposed to the War Department that measures be adopted to take possession of Matthias Point, in order to secure the navigation of the Potomac from any danger of being interrupted. From some cause, no steps were then taken for that purpose. The subject was again brought to the attention of the War Department by the Navy Department in the month of August, shortly after the bat-tle of Bull Run. Nothing, however, was done at

that time in regard to it. In October, 1861, the Navy Department again urged the matter upon the consideration of the War Department. The Port Royal expedition was then in preparation, and would soon be ready to start. The Navy Department represented that it would be absolutely necessary to send with that expedition, in order to insure its success, the greater portion of the Potomae flotilla, because, being very powerful vessels, of light draught, with their machinery protected, they were better fitted for that service than any other vessels in the possession of the Navy Department; and if anything was to be done by them to secure the uninterrupted navigation of the Potomac, it must be done before they left. It was proposed to the President and the War Department that the gunboats should take and destroy the Rebel batteries which had then begun to make their appearance upon the river, and which even then endangered the safety of vessels passing up and down the Potomac. When that had been done, it was proposed that a sufficient number of troops should be landed at Matthias Point, &c., to intrench them-selves, under the protection of the gnuboats, until they should be able, with the assistance of the smaller boats of the Potomic flotilla, to hold their position against any force the enemy would be likely to bring against them. It was represented that unless some such steps were taken the departure of those vessels upon the Port Royal expedition would be the signal for the closing of the navigation of the Potomac, which representation the result proved to be correct. As was well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army cooperate with the may in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a chanuel of communication to be closed.

WHY IT WAS NOT RAISED.

After repeated efforts, Gen. McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. The Navy Department provided the necessary transports for the troops, and Capt. Cruven, commanding the Potomas florilla, upon being notified to that effect, collected at Matthias Point all the beats of his flotilla at the time named. The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Capt. Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of Gen. McClellan why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he had concluded not to send them. Capt. Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge; that they had provided the necessary means to accomplish the landing successfully; that no inquiry had been made of them in regard to that matter, and no notification that the troops were not to be sent.

It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Capt. Craven was again notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that

purpose.

Capt. Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the Committee as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was, that Gen. McCtellan feared it might bring

on a general engagement.

The President, who had united with the Navy Department in urging their proposition, first upon Gen. Scott and then upon Gen. McClellan, manifested great disappointment when he learned that the plan had failed in consequence of the troops not being And Capt. Craven threw up his command on the Potomac and applied to be sent to sea, saying that, by remaining here and doing nothing, he was but losing his own reputation, as the blame for permitting the Potomac to be blockaded would be imputed to him and the flotilla under his command.

Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy Department the effective vessels of the Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter closed, and remained closed until the Rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening communication by that route.

ORDERS TO MOVE.

On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United States, one resalt of which was the series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land.

LINE OF OPERATIONS.

After this long period of inaction of the Army of the Potomac the President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following

"Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 31, 1862.
"Iresident's Special War Order No. 1.
"Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safety for the defense of Washington, he formed into an expedition for the immediate object of selzing and occupying a point upon the rairroad southwest-ward of what is known as Maussasa Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the General-u-Chief, and the ex-pedition to move before or on the 2.1d day of February next. **ARRAHAM LINCOLN."

To this order Gen. McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as involving "the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle (the Occoquan) and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check." He then proceeded to argue in favor of a movement by way of the Rappahaunock or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would be required to provide the necessary means of transportation. He stated that he regarded "success as certain, by all the chances of war," by the route no proposed, while it was "by no means certain that we can beat them [the enemy] at Manassas."

To this the President made the following reply:

To this the President made the following reply:

"Executive Mansion, Washington, Feb. 3, 1662.

"My Dear Sire: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Procumac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahamook to Urbania, and across land to the terminus of the radical on York River; mine to move directly to a point on the radical on York River; of Manssess. If you will give me estisiatory answers to the following questions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

"I. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger exponditure of time and money than mile?

"2. Wherein is a victory more cortain by your plan than mine?

mine? Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan then

mino? "4. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communication, while mine would?

" 5. In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be more difficult by your plan than by mine?
"Yours, truly,
"Major-Gen. McClellan." " A LINCOLN.

Your Committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by Gen. McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862. That council—the first, so far as your Committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by Gen. McClellan, and then by the direction of the President-was composed of twelve generals, as follows: McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, Barnard, and Naglee (from Gen. Hooker's Division).

To them was submitted the question whether they would indorso the line of operations which Gen. McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the de-liberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake Bay, up the Rappabannock, landing at Urbanna, and across the country to Richmond. The four Generals who voted against the proposed movement were Gens. McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman and Barnard. Gen. Keyes voted for it with the qualification that no enange should be made until the enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac.

At this point it may be well to consider the principal arguments for and against the movement upon Richmond direct from Washington, and the movement by way of the Lower Chesapeake, including that first proposed by way of the Rappahannock river, and the one finally adopted by way of For-

tress Monroe and the peninsula.

In expressing opinions upon this and other subjects relating more immediately to military operations in the field, your Committee do not undertake to form and express opinions of their own, but content themselves with setting forth those expressed in their testimony by military men whose education and experience entitle them to speak confidently upon those subjects pertaining to their profession.

WHY THE DIRECT ROUTE WAS BEST.

The arguments in favor of the direct and against the lower route to Richmond were many and weighty. Some of them are most tersely expressed in the letter of the President to Gen. McCleflan, of February 3, 1862, before referred to. Beside those, the direct movement enabled the largest amount of troops to operate actively in the field, as the army in its movement immediately covered Washington, and thereby rendered the presence of a large force here unnecessary. By the adoption of the lower route a division of the army was rendered impera-tive, in order to provide for the safety of the Capital against any attack from the enemy. Thus, to use the language of Gen. McClellan Lim-eff, in reference to the movement proposed ing linst the c. emy while at Manassas, "committing the error of divid-ing our army by a very afficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support cach other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy while the other is held in check."

The army in moving direct from Waskington avoided all the delays and as order consequence upon the embarkation and disemplikation of so large a force with all its material. And by investing Richmond on the north and north-west, we cat them off from one of their great sources of supply, the bacaandoah Valley, and at the same time prevented their raids through that region of country, which so par-ulyzed all efforts to send the few troops left in Washington to the assistance of the army on the peninsula.

Gen. McCtellan states in his testimony that by adopting the route by way of Annapolis and the Rappahannock, he hoped, if proper secresy was preserved, to be able to reach the vicinity of Richmond before the Rebel army at Manass is could be concentrated there for its defense. Whatever probability there may have been for the realization of such a hope at the time the Rapahranack route was decided upon, it was entirely removed when the enemy evacured Manassas, before any netual movement was made by our army. And Gen. McClellan at ouce relinquished the Rappahannock route, and decided, with the concurrence of his corps commanders, to go by way of Yorktown and the peninsula.

One great objection to the peninsula route, as indie ted by the testimony of all the witnesses who testify upon that point, including Gen. McClellan himself, was the to at want of information in reference to the nature of the country there, the kind and condition of the roads, the preparations for defense, &c. The oifficulties and embarrassments our army labored under from the beginning of that campaign. from that want of information, are very evident from the testimony.

DECISION OF THE COUNCIL.

The decision of the council of two lve Generals in February was to move by way of Annapolis ant thence to the Rappahannock. The question of reopening the navigation of the Potomae, by driving the enemy from their batteries upon the river, was discussed. It was, however, finally decided that the enemy should be left in possession of their batteries, and the movement should be made without disturbing them. This is proven by the testimouy, and also by the second paragraph of the order of the President, dated March 8, 1862, as follows:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 8, 1862.

"President's General Burnsher, Analon, Analon, 1900.
"President's General Burnsher, Ao. 3.
"Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Promacosh of the macosh of the macosh of white the large in and about Wassington for a force as, it the open one of the General Inc. (Ab faced the Commanders of all the Army Corps, shall be about the commanders of all the Army Corps, shall be about the commanders of all the Army Corps, shall be about the commanders of all the Army Corps, shall be about the commanders of the commanders of the commanders of the Army Corps, shall be about the commanders of the c

Trovas Adit. Gen."

Our the enemy's ba teries and othe reastract, i.e., or until the President shall hareafter give expressions. In the President shall hareafter give expressions are now base of operations, which may be ordered by the Conservation, i.e., and which may be intended to move upon the Conservation bay, shall begin to move upon the Bay as conjustion lotted bay, shall begin to move upon the Bay as conjustion to the March inst, and the General-in-Charle shall be respectively in the transfer of the Conservation of the transfer of the Conservation of the Conservation of the Conservation of the Potomao between Washington and the Chesapean of ay.

"ABRAILMI LINCOLN."

"L. THOMAS, Adjt.-Gen."

Before the movement by way of Appunolis could be executed, the enemy abundoned their butteries apon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at Centreville and Manassas, returns to the line or the Rappahannock.

MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY.

When Gen. McClellan, then in the City of Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuate I Mamassal, he proceeded across the viver and ordered a general inovement of the wholearmy much direction of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The army moved on the morning of the 10th of March, the greater put of it proceeding no further than Fairfix Court-II ase. A small force of the army processed to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rapp homock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge acres it.

On the 11th or March Gen. McCtellan ordered, by telegraph, the transports from Annapolis to Washingion (Alexandran'), to embark the army from there, and informed the Department that he proposed to occupy Mans-us with a portion of Gen. Banks's command, and throw all the force be could concentra o upon the line previously determized upon. Subsequent events in the valley of the Shenandown, terminating, for a time, in the battle of Warchester, of March 23, prevented the force under Gen. Banks from leaving that valley.

ANOTHER COUNCIL.

On the 13th of March Gen. McClellan convened at. Fairfax Court-House a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps (Gen. Banks being absent), and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of inovement by way of York and James Rivers. The result of the denberations of that council was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
FAIRTAX COURT-HOUSE, March 13, E62.
"A council of the Generals commanding army corps at the
headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the

"A council of the General se unmanding army corps at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the opinion:
"First: That the enemy, having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the R. probannock and the Rapidan, its the opinion of the generals contained the the representation of the property of the theorem of the property of the theorem of the property of the tendential garmy corps that the operations to be curried on will be best undertaken from Bichmond; provided, first, that the enemy's vesset, the Merimac, can be neutralized; second, the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washin ton and Alexandria to move down the Potomac; third, that a naval auxiliary force can be had to silecte or at all in silencing the enemy's batteries in York River; fourth, that the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. Unanmous.

"Second: If this forgoing compose, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappalasmock at the bemoved against the enemy behind the Rappalasmock at the bear distribution of the representation of the property of the carries possible moment, and the meanst it reconstructing bridges, repairing rairroads, and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at conce be collected for took the Orange and Alexandria and the Acquia and Richmond Raidcads. Unanimous.

"Note —That with the first on the right bank of the Percentage first properties."

for both the Orange and Alexandria and the Acquis and Richmond Raiforads. Unanimous.

"Norz.—That with the first on the right bank of the Pertonna fully garrisoued, and those on the left bank compiled, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of \$25,000 men would stiffee, (Keyes, Heintzeiman and McDowell.) A total of \$0,000 men for the defense of the city would scifice, (Sumner.)"

The same day Gen. McClellan informed the War Department that "the Council of Commanders of Army Corps have unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations, and Gen. McDowell will at once proceed with it to Washington and lay it before you."

To this the Secretary of War replied: "Whatever plan has been agreed upon proceed at once to execute, without losin; an bour for my approval."

THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS.

The plan of operations was submitted to the President on the same day, and he approved the same; but gave the following directions as to its execution: but gave the following directions as to its execution:

"First: Leave such force at Manassa Junction as shall
make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess
himself of that post ion and line of communication.

"See not: Leave Washington secure.

"Tand: Move the remainder of the force down the Potonyc, choosing a new base at Fortress Mource, or anywherebetween here and there; or, at all events, move such re-

main er of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by some route."

EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY.

The army was directed to return to Alexandria to to embarked for the peninsula; previous to their e abarkation all the corps to be concentrated upon the division nearest Alexandria. The transportation not proving sufficient for immediate embarkadian, the troops were, for several cays, exposed to the rains which then set in, being deprived of their Towner cam ing accommodations, although, in many instances, not far distant from them, having only +. elter tents to protect them from the inclemency of the weather.

To Gen. McDowell was at first assigned the advance of the expedition. Lat when it was found that there was not transportation enough to embark at once his outire corps, he consented, in order to util ze what was there, to allow his troops to remain untit such time as they could be moved together, with the understanding that the troops preceding him should not operate upon bis proposed field of labor. The result, however, was, that the corps of Gen. McDowell was pat off till the last, which, in pursuance of subsequent orders, led to his corpe

HOW WASHINGTON WAS LEFT UNDEFENDED. By reference to the President's general war order, No 3 of March 3, 1862, it will be seen that no

change of base of operations of the army of the Potomac was to be made without Laving in and about tomac was to be made without leaving in and about Washing on such a force as I in the common not only of Gra. McCiell up hat it for a communers of all the army cones," was said in it to read a the capital entirely searce. A deby a cone of the countil forward that I is fact Cont. House, on the 12th of advanced I, I, county of Gra. In Downell, Suretice, I shoughful, and Engag it will be searth at the council account necessary for the shough of Washington Stant to form on the 11th back of the Product found to the form on the 11th back of the Product found at the General account of the council account to the countil form on the form of 12th back of the Product for the General accountil to a definition of the Control of the Product form of the Control of the Product form of the Control of the Product form of the Control of the Product for the Product for the Control of the Product for the P Washing on such a force as in the comion not only

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"There will thus be left for a gradement and the front of Washington under Comment and moral, indeed men, exclusive of the batter's auderinance in the forest of a New-York, Herra willy other yname of the first will only name of the first will only name of the first will be assembled at Washing to the first yname of the first will only in the first will of the first will be a first wil

This statement, to use the expression of one of the witnesses, was "very indefinite." (Icu. Wadsworth, who had been ordered to take charge of the defenses of Washington, upon learning the disposi-tions of troops proposed by Gen. McClellan, and feeling the great importance of the trult committed to his charge, and the total inadequacy of the means provided him for that purpose, addressed to the Secretary of War the following communication:

"Headquarters Historian's Lorent's of Washinston, "Washinston, "Washinstones Inc. A care poor, "Sim: I have the horse to stor, a thin of the "combined of tenun sof the force leadering commit a fortisted force to Washinston, "I have been a soft to soft with the combined to the combined training and the state of the s

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The content of the I medically Gen McChings designed to be a series of five I medically Gen McChings designed two I medically Gen McChings designed two I medical in the I medical in the I medical dynamics of the I medical dyna

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"Neads: The counts I proceed officers held of Pairfux Carrier and the country of the c

gives a representation as follows: At Warrenton there is to be 7,730; at Manas-a, sny, 19,353; in the valley of the Shenandoah, 35,407; on the Lower Potomac, 1,350. Total in all, 55,436, And there would be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under Gen. Wadsworth, some 13,600. In the above enumeration, Gen. Banks's Army Corps is included; but whether this corps, operating in the Shenandoah Vally, should be regarded as a part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington, the nudersigned express no engine.

Fifth: Gen. Wadsworth's report of April 2d gives his "Fyin: Gen. Wadsworth's report of April 2d gir force as follows: intantry, 15,335; artillery, 4,494; c 858—six companies only being mounted. Total, 20,477. "Deduct sick, in arrest and confinement, 1,455. To cavalry.

duty, 19,022.

"From this force Gen. Wadsworth is directed to dotach "From this force Gen. Wadsworth is directed to dotach two good regiments to Richardson's division, Sumuer's corps, which should be deducted from his command, one regiment to replace the 37th New-York, in Heintzelman's old division, and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's

toreplace the 3rth New-York, in Heintzelman's old division, and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's Ferry—total, four regiments.

"It is also oddred to send 4,000 men to relieve Summer at Manassas and Warrenton. Gen. Wadsworth represents that he has no mounted light artillery under his command; states that there were several companies of reserve utillery still here, but not under his command, or fit for service.

"Gen. Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force snew and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorg mized condition, some of them having been relieved from brizades which have gone into the field, in consequence of their unfitness for service, the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place; two heavy sitillery regiments and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for months in artillery service, having been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and their places supplied with new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position. If there was need of a military force for the safety of the City of Washington within its own limits, that referred to in the report of Gen. Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate.

within is own limits, that referred to in the report of Gen. Wadsworth would seem to be entirely jusdequate.

"In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by Gen. McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of the opinion that the requirements of the President, that the city shall be left "entirely secure" not only in the opinion of the general-nehief, but that of the "commanders of the army corps" also, has not been fully complied with.

"All of which is respectfully subnitited."

"E. A. HITCHCOCK, Mej.-Gen. U. S. A."

THE PRESIDENT PROTECTS THE CAPITAL. The day after this report was written, the President directed the Secretary of War to order one corps of the Army of the Potomac to remain in front of Washington until further orders. The corps of Gen. McDowell, being the only corps remaining intact here, was selected to remain, without the knowledge of Gen. McDowell, he being engaged, at the time of receiving this order, in making preparations to immediately follow the rest of the army to the penin-

THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN.

Gen. Heintzelman, who commanded the first troops of the army of the Potomae that landed on the peninsula, arrived at Fortress Monros on the 23d of March, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas. He had orders to encamp as near Fortress Monroe as possible, in order that the enemy should have no idea of the direction in which the army was to move, whether toward Yorktown or Norfolk. Gen. Heintzelman states that shortly after landing he obtained information that the enemy had not more than 10,000 troops at Yorktown and on the Peninsula, and is satisfied that he could have advanced and isolated Yorktown, in which case there would have been no serious obstacle in the way of proceeding directly to Richmond. On the 27th of March he cent out reconnottering parties as far as Big Bethel and Watt's Creek, and went near the Haif way House, where about 400 of the enemy, and a little artillery were seen. He telegraphed to Gen. McClellan what he was doing, and received a dispatch, in reply, that he (Gen. McClellan) hoped that nothing had been done to give the enemy information of the line of operations of the army. The reconnoissance was then withdrawn.

Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe, and on the 2d of April Gen. McClellan himself arrived. On the 4th of April the army commenced its movement in the direction of Yorktown, and on the

5th appeared before the enemy's lines. Gen. Mc-Clelian states that he moved from Fortress Monroe sooner than he otherwise would have done, upon hearing that the enemy were sending down re-enforcements.

DELAY BEFORE YORKTOWN.

All the testimony goes to prove that when our troops first landed on the Peninsula the force of the enemy there consisted of Magruder's command, varionsly estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except by Gen. McClellan, who estimates it from 15,000 to 20,000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, United States Senator from Virginia—then living within the Rebel lines, near Williamsburg-testifies that the Rebels did not determine to re-enforce Magruder until it was apparent that our forces intended to stop be-fore Yorktown and commence a regular siege of the place. It is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that our forces, when they first appeared before Yorktown, could have pierced the line of works across the Peninsula there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown, and cutting off re-enforcements, when the place must have fallen in a very short time. Some of our Generals expected and desired that that should be done. Gen. Heintzelman forwarded to Gen. McClellan the application of Gen. Hamilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy's lines. No answer was received to the application.

HOW MANY TROOPS M'CLELLAN HAD.

Instead of that, however, a siege was determined upon, contrary to the desire of the President, who, as early as the 9th of April, wrote to Gen. McClellan as follows:

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. I telegraphed you on the 6th, urging that you had ever 100,000 with you. I had just obtained from the Sec-retary of Wara statement, taken, as he said, from your own retary of Wara statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say that you will have not 05,000, when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy 25,000 be accounted for? As to Gen. Wool's cemmand, I understand tits doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away. "I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will steadly gain on you—that is, be will gain faster by fortifications of each of the process of the same processing it is an you on hyth confirmants.

tions and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements

alone.

"And, once more, let me tall you it is indispensable to you that you strike a hlow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always wished not going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at on near Manassa, as only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal intranchments at either place. The country well not fail to note—is noting new—that the present heritation to move upon an intrenched position is but the story of Manassas repeated."

And the repetition was made complete nearly a month later, when the enemy, in the face of a superior force, evacuated their works without loss and without the knowledge of the general commanding our army.

M'CLELLAN WANTS MORE TROOPS.

Gen. McClellan, however, did not deem his forces sufficient, and objected very strongly to the order of the President detaching McDowell's corps for the defense of Washington, as "imperiling the success of our canse." He called again and again for reenforcements, asking for Franklin's and McCall's Divisions of McDowell's corps, to be under command of Franklin; insisting that Franklin's Division, at least, should be sent to him. On the 11th of April Franklin's Division was ordered to Alex-andria to embark for Fort Monroe. On the 14th, Gen. Franklin reported to Gen. McClellan near Yorktown, but his troops remained on board the transports until after the enemy evacuated the place, when they were ordered to West Point.

HE WANTS TRANSPORTATION.

On the 6th of April Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the President, "I have by no means the transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles;" and asks that all his orders for wagon trains,

&c., may at once be complied with. Ail was sent. to him as desired, until even Gen. McDowell found himself so stripped of the transportation designed for his corps, that when he moved to Fredericksburg it was with the greatest difficulty he could move supplies for his small force from Acquia to Falmouth until the railroad was completed.

A month was spent before Yorktown, our army, in the opinion of some of our ablest officers, becoming more demoralized by the labors of a long siege toan it would have been even by an unsuccessful

The returns in the Adjutant-General's office. signed by Gen. McClellan and his Adjutant-General, show that on the 30th of April, 1862, the forces on the Peninsula under Gen. McClellan amounted to 112,392 present for duty.

HE WANTS GUNS.

On the 1st of May the President telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite prograstination. Is anything to be done?" VORKTOWN EVACUATED-M'CLELLAN GRINED.

On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of May, the enemy evacuated Yorktown without loss. One of the witnesses testifies that Gen. Mc-Clellan was very much chagrined and mortified at the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to open from his batteries on Monday, the 5th of May.

PURSUIT OF THE RECELS.

The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the morning of the 4th. Between 10 and 11 o'clock, Gen. Stoneman, with the cavilry and some light horse artillery, started in pursuit. About I o'clock, Gen. Hooker, with his division, left Yorktown, with orders to support Gen. Stoneman. Gens. Sumner. Heintzelman and Keves also moved out during the day, with the whole or portions of their corps. About five miles from Yorktown the division of Gen. Hooker was delayed for some time in consequence of other troops, coming from another direction, getting into the road before him.

In the meantime Gen. Stoneman had overtaken the rear of the enemy with his cavalry, and followed them up closely, keeping up a running fire all the time, until the enemy reached their works in the neighborhood of Williamsburg, when the pursuit was checked. Gov. Sprague was sent back to hurry up the infantry support under Gen. Hooker. After considerable delay, finding it impossible to pass the troops ahead of him, Gen. Hooker turned off and proceeded by another road, of which he had obtained information from some of the inhabitants; marched till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at daylight, and came up to the advanced works of the enemy a little after 7 o'clock, about half a mile from Fort Magruder, and at once engaged the enemy.

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

There seems to have been great misapprehension and confusion in relation to the management of the troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first commenced on Sunday, Gen. Heintzelman was in-structed by Gen. McClellan to take charge of operations in front. On the morning of Monday orders were sent to Gen. Sumner to take the command; Gen. McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to superintend the sending of two divisions up the York River to West Point. A heavy run set in on Sunday, rendering the reads almost impracticable for the passage of troops. The troops of the different commands became mingled-divisions and brigades, to some extent, were separated from each other-and it seems to have been difficult to get the troops up in time.

During Monday forenoon Gen. Hooker, finding himself hard pressed by the enemy, and understanding that Gen. Sumner had 30,000 troops with him, seut repeatedly for reenforcements. So did Gen. Stoneman and Gen. Heintzelman, but no recuforce-ments arrived. Gen. Sumner states that, having sent Gen. Hancock to the right, he had at the center

only about 3.000 infantry—the cavalry there not being fitted for operations against the enemy, on account of the country being so wooded. Upon receiving the call for regnforcements to be sent to the left to Gen. Hooker, he sent staff officers to harry up troops from the rear, his own corps being some ten miles off, and ordered Kearney to re-enforce Hooker. Re-enforcements not coming up to Gen. Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the Prince de Joinville and Gov. Sprague went to Yorktown to urge Gen. McClellan to come up to the front, and take charge of matters there. GOV Sprague arrived at Yorktown about 1 o'clock, having been about an hour in going down. He testifies that when Gen. McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he remarked that he had supposed "those in front could attend to that little matter." After some time Gen. McClellan started from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Williamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

HOOKER DOES THE FIGHTING.

By that time Gen. Kearney had reached the field and re-enforced Gen. Hooker, taking command. being the senior in rank to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hancock had been engaged on the right, but, upon being re-enforced, had succeeded in repulsing the en-emy, losing about forty men. The principal fighting was done by the troops under Gen. Hooker, his di-vision sustaining a loss of about 1,700 men. Before he was re-enforced, his troops were obliged to hold their position with the bayonet and such ammuni-tion as the men could obtain from the bodies of those who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that it was impossible to bring up fresh ammunition.

RETREAT AND PURSUIT.

That night the enemy evacuated their position at Williamsburg. Gen. McClellan states that after he arrived on the field he was so satisfied that the enemy had been beaten and would be compelled to evacnate their position that night or be taken at a great disadvantage, that he countermanded orders to the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick and sent them back to Yorktown.

The next day the pursuit was continued for a short distance by Gen. Stoneman and the cavalry, with a small body of infantry. Several of the Generals testify that, had the enemy been promptly fol-lowed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they could have been followed right into Richmond—one of them says without firing a gun. Gen. McCtellan says that the roads were so bad, in consequence of the rains, teat it was impracticable to make

vigorous pursuit. The battle of Williamsburg appears to have been fought under many and serious disadvantages. No hing was known of the nature of the country or

the delensive works of the enemy until our troops arrived before them; there was no controlling mind in charge of the movements; there was uncertainty in regard to who was in command: each Ganeral fought as he considered best; and, by the time the General Commanding appeared on the field, the principal part of the fighting was over.

FURTHER DELAY. Some three or four days were spent at Williams. burg for the purpose of bringing up supplies, &c., and then the line of march was taken up for the Chickahominy. It was about the time that the army left Williamsburg that Norfolk was taken and the Merrimac destroyed. But preparations had been made before those events occurred to have supplies sent up York River instead of the James, and the line afterwards followed was adopted. consequence was that the gunboats were of little or no service in the operations against Richmond, and remained entirely heactive, except in some operations against Fort Darling, until they were called upon to protect the army when, in July, it fell back to the James River.

The distance between Williamsburg and the line of operations on the Chickahominy was from forty to fifty miles, and the army was most two weeks

in moving that clatares. The first been that closed the Unickneeping very the cornect thereof accessed the Unickneeping very the cornect thereof accessed the Unickness tent set in 6 hay, followed by the caps of the Hair zhan of the 25th. The rest of our ray various had the left hak of the Colekabenhay will the boths of The Oaks, when the capsocial School has boths of The Oaks, when the capsocial School has boths of The Oaks, when the capsocial had the school of the Oaks, when the capsocial had the school of the Oaks, when the capsocial had been capsocially structured to the capsocial form of the McCletten color of the access of the en my in his fact was easily to the foreaun for Con. Mobile the Hard for the protection of West count feet that the foreaun for the country the number of the Alexander Con. MeDowald's copy he sent to this by water eather than he had, to the most expect to a degree of a sent than the place of the control of the place of the country that had had, to the most expect it is under the character than he had, to the most expect it is under the oaks. Gen. MeD Wall a copy is sens to maily where rather than by hand, as the moles expect his an ede, and that he call has fore a be explicitly if a land r his orders, "in the ordinary way." He closes his letter by saying:

"I beli-ve there is a great struggle before this orray, but I "I belt-vo there is a great strongle before this arms, but I sum neither dishmyeth is dishmissing. I first it is described its force as now has I can; but, in ally easy to I fill it this with all this shift, and condour, and dishmissing in the tribing the research. All I treat at the region and content to the form the wew. And I trust that the result may either of tain for me the permanent confidence of my Government, or that it may close my career."

In reply to the request of General McClellan that General McDowell should join his forces by water, the President states, on the Mist of May:

"McDowell can reach voiby liblso pertion be could get "McDowell can reach you by Ludson artism he could get aboard of boars if the hears who are lyst F see leks ung, unless his murch shad be resisted, in which creat of rearesisting him withness had be resisted, in which creat of rearesisting him withness had be not be will reach you in five days after strong; whereas, by water, he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Fruskin's single division did not reach you in ten days after 1 ordered it."

JACKSON IN THE SHENANDOAH.

Preparations were accordingly made for General McDowell to leave Fredericksburg on the 25th of May to join Gen. McClellan. Just at that time, the Shenndon's Valley, and Gen. McDowell, together with Gen. Fremont, from Western Vigginia, was sent to the assistance of Gen. Banks, and to inwas sens by the assistance of Gen. Bills, and to intercept Jackson in h a retreat. Upon being informed of this, Gen. McClellan replied that the movement of Jackson was probably intended to prevent reenforcements being sent to him. The President replied, giving him full information as to the condition

of affairs in the vidley, and closed by saying:
"If McDowell's forcer as now leyend our reach we should be utterly helpless. Apprehensions of something lies this, and no new hit gness to a tening you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Pleaso understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you now

BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.

On the 31st of May and the 1st of June the battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks were fought. As there has been so much controversy in regard to the conduct of some of the troogs engaged in that bat tle, your Committee wall refer more particularly to the testimony of Gen. Casey, who commanded the advanced division, upon which the attack was first made. Gen. Casey states that, when the campaign of the Peniasala commanced, his division consisted principally of raw and inexperienced troops. They had suffered greatly from the Libers and exposures incident upon the siego of Yor town and the advance of the troops up the Peninsula. Some of them had been for weeks without shelter, being compelled to leave their camp equipage behind when ordered on the pursuit of the enemy after the evacuation of Yorktown. That division took the lead across the Chickanominy, taking up a position at Seven Pines, where it established itself by throwing up intrenchments and cutting abatis.

A few days before the buttle of Seven Pines, contrary to the advice and of inion of Gen. Keres and Gen. Casey, the division was ordered three-quarters of a mile to the front, within six miles of Richmond, his pickets extending within two miles. They had no support on their right or their left, the remainder of the corps to which they belonged (Keyes's) being

in their rear. The vat once commenced dirging riflepi sand out it galatis, the pickets at night being at-pi sand out it, galatis, the pickets at night being at-ouckelly the cheny, who were repulsed. About Il o'cle k out the insumar of the first the pickets re-If o'do k on the morning of the 31st they release reported the contained growning, and an all of General debases was equal to the prefect of property of the state of the day, what the first contains a book of the day, what to General terms to be sufficient to the day, what to General terms to the first of the day, what to General terms to Contain the first of the contained to some the contained to some the first of the contained to some the first of the first of the some the sent to Contain the first of the contained to construct the first of th attack. Two hard of basis were a seculous in the ride; its, that another also trought and a mile in advance—composed of five or rist regiment and four pieces of artiflery. A regiment had previously been sent out to support the liefets. A mout 2) minutes to 1 o'check the enemy commence I the attack in force, a possel to amount to about 35,000 men, attacking in front and on both flinks. After fighting for some time, the enemy continuing to come on in force, the forces in front fell back to the fill-pits, and fought there until nearly surrounded. Re-enforcements had been promised, and Gen. Casey had selected to position to which they were to be assigned; but to re-cuforcements came up to his position until just before Le was forced to fall back from bis second line, when a single regiment arrived. After about three hours' figuring the division fell back. from its second line with a loss of 1,433 in killed, wounded, and musing. In the course of an hour after Casey's division had teen driven back, the remainder of our forces were swept back from a mile and a half to two miles from Casey's firet line, when the enemy were checked, and the fighting ceased for: the day.

During the battle Gen. Sammer, whose corps was on the left bank of the Chi kahoming, was ordered by Gen. McClellan to hold his forces in readiness to cross. Gen. Sumner not only did that, but at once called out his forces and moved them nut I the heads of the columns were at the tridges ready to cross, thereby saving between one and two hours. When the order came to cross he immediately moved his forces in the direction of the field of battle, came up with and engaged the enemy, and relieved the pressure upon the troops engaged upon his left.

BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS.

The next day, the 1st of June, the enemy attacked Gen. Summer at Fair Oaks. Gen. Hooke, the had been ordered forward the day before by Gen. Heinte-zelman with one-helf of his division, hearing the firing of the enemy upon Gen. Summer's forces, pro-ceded at ones in that direction and engaged the enemy. In a short time the carmy were repulsed, and fell back in confusion. There was no communicution between the forces under Gen. Summer and hole under Gen. Heintz Iman (Hocker's), but each fon this as he deemed best under the arcamstances. on the lift bank of the Chickarominy. After the fighting was over he came across to the right bank. of the river.

HOOKER'S RECONNOISSANCE

On the morning of Monday Gen. Heintzelman ordered Gen. Hooker to make a reconneissance in force, which he did, advancing to within four miles of Richmond, meeting with no rest tance except a little from the enemy's pickets. Upon being informed by Gen. Hentzelnan of what he had done, Gen. McClellan ordered the troops to be recalled and occupy the position that had been held by Casey's

The officers engaged in that battle, who have been examined, testing that the army could have pushed right on to the City of R.chmond with talle resistance; that the energy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c., That might impede their flight. Gan. McChellan seems to have contemplated an immediate movement upon Richmond, for, the day of or the bettle June 2, he writes to the Secretary of War:

June 2, he writes to the Secretary of War:

"The every affects I inference duth an apply yester-daymoning, but we very norm of them by no placed with greatless. Our tooks charged it concertly of both days at uniformly head that on no. They result is, that our left with of our hill soff the hood. I only what I runviver to fall to closs what we staff the ference and me eagenered unters. So what we staff tooks to an order a very store passed on the property of the ference of the feren

The m vement was not made, however, as Gen. McChi an state, Lecause of the Lig i stage of water and the bad roads.

MORE RE-EFFORCIMINTS.

On the Oth of Jane Meddl's civi ion of Gen. McD well's corps was ordered to j in the army on Metrower scorps was consected in the common of the periodia. On the 8th of June Gen. McCl. than telept of her "I shall be in period readiness to move forwards of take Richmond the moneus that Me-Callicales has and the ground will adout the passa of full lery." On the Fitner 11th of June McCall's troo, s commenced arriving at the Write House.

Prepration or finned to be mode in Washington Programme or figured to be mode in Washington to send down by Lord from Producted surpling the remainder of Com. Mr. Downlife corps, be being directed to cooper to addy with Gen. M. C. Lian, in trataining and identification of the constant of product compound. This constitution products have been in accordance with General McChlinds wister; for, on the 10th of June, he telegraphs to the Secretary of Vents.

"Irealt to be districtly well oforter to McDowelland "It could to be distinctly will observe it. M. Dowell and his too street implies you for you not be recived a telegratif and impassing the message with in facility passing the message in the street in the street. That is expected as a threater that you give you have arrows consistent as to the district the country attrood and other that is not consistent as a threater who countries countries you have not been also because of the street to be a command. If the most that you define the purpose of in the street to be a command. If the most that you define the purpose of in the street is a supersonable to the street of the stree

On the 18 h of June, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the Scotting of War that Le has received information from Ceseriers to the effect that troops have left Richmond to re-entrace Jackson; that the movement commenced on the 8.h; and that if re-enforcements have gone to Jackson, they are probably not less than 10,000 men; that he cannot youch for the truth of the at dement, but that it access pactly cortain that it is believed in Riel mond and among the Rebel troms. To this the President replies, on the amo day, that the information is correbolated by a disputch from Gen. King at Plederickeburg, and remails: "If this is true, it is a good as a reenforcement to you of a reconference of the came day Gen. Mich Han telegraphs to the

President:

President:

"A proprilenging ment may it. These timy hour. An advance evide invites a continue of posicisite. The enemy exited to every police ments at the course from or fitten about a transfer and the content of the order locks on, it instances to transfer ments on the enemy exited by the fitten of the ments at transfer ment in the enemy of the continuence of the fitten of the continuence of the continuence of the continuence of the continuence.

STEPNATH OF THE COMP.

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.

The returns of Gen. M Cl. Ban to the Adjutant. General's office give the following as the a reagth of the army on the peningula on the SSA of June: Present for duty, 115,102; special duty, sick and in arrest, 12,905; absent, 29,511—total, 156,838.

STUART'S RAID.

About this time the Rebel General, Stuart, with his cavalry, made his colebrated raid, waking the ontire circuit of our trmy unharmed, and discovering the nature of our communications with the York River.

JACKSON THREATERS AR ATTACK.

On the 21th and 25th of June, Gen. McClellan theory q be the Secretary of War that I alie in ormed by describers and contrabands that Ja Eson is conby describers and contrabancs that ha issue is con-temploing on whose upon listight and ran. As this described from McClellers, and the one of the President in reply, or detel home-likely positions to the "seven days" lattle," they are given here in

"Received 8.50 p. m.

McCerrian's Jime 25—C.15 p. m.

"There just return of contained distributed by an algorithm of the market distributed by an algorithm of the contained algorithm of the distributed by a strong of the proposition that Jesser's advance is absential fit over the fit see, and that eathering a serviced, with strong the information that Jesser's advance is about a strong of the fit of the contained fit of the contained and the strong of the fit of the contained fit of the c bowy is possible for the land through the active possible active possible decisive possible active the test that the construction of the possible active possible active possible active possible active the construction of the possible active possible active the construction of the possible active possible active the construction of the construct

" Major-General McClentan."

BATTLE OF MECHANICSVILLE.

On the after som of the 10 h of June, between 2 am: Co'clock, the chemy, in considerable force, made and obtack, the chemy, in coston of the man and and obtains thek upon the troops of Gen. M. Call's Division, stationed at Machanics till, consisting of the two brightess of Reymour and Raynels. The action listed until nightful, when the chemy were repulsed. Troops were sent up by Gen. Porter to the assistance of those engaged but they were not in the built, though some of them were in position.

About 12 o'cleck that had the troo; were ordered to fall hak to Gaines's Mill, which was ne-

complished without I ss.

BATTLE OF GAINES'S MILL.
On the 57th to lattle of Gain.s's Mill was fought, principally by Cotroops under then. Porter. Our forces there engaged were from 27,000 to 31,000: the force of the enemy being from two to three times that number. The cuery were in each su-petion free that, although our trees fought with chee ding bravery, they were driven lack with a less of about 2,000 men, in kiffed, wounded and miscing.

of the country of the follows:

"Question. Whatever right have been the intentions of the convy, as the brack was to have been male by him, would it not have been but or to have y see both wings of every on the simulation that the Chickelomins prior to the bar for Gaines at 1.1?
"As well do not this before each to have been been because

Asswer. I do not think they ought to have been brought to the same side of the river before they actually were.

"Question. What advantage was gained by leaving the right wing of our army to be attacked by a greatly superior force?
"Answer. It prevented the enemy from getting on our flank and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the army and its material.
"Question. Will you explain what was done by the right wing of our army at or about the time the left was engaged which saved our lack from attack and enabled the army and its material to be withdrawn?
"Answer. By desperie fighting they inflicted so great a

"Answer. By despera's fighting they inflicted so great a loss on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of the way."

RETREAT OF THE WHOLE ARMY DECIDED ON.

During the night after the battle of Gaines's Mill all our forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahom nv, and the next day the movement to the James River was determined upon. Gen. Heintzelman testiles that the night after that battle he was sent for by Gen. McClellan; that he found everything packed, ready to leave; that Gen. Mc-Clellan said there were two things to be done—to concentrate his forces and risk all on a battle, or to withdraw to the James River; that if he risked a battle there, and was beaten, the army was destroyed. Gen. Heintzelman advis d him not to nisk a battle under such circumstances, for if that army was lost the cause would be lost; that it were better to go to the James River and await re-enforcements. Gen. McClellan replied that he was of that opinion himself, and that was determined upon. That night, at 12:20 a. m., Gen. McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he (Gen. McClellan) is not responsible for the result, but feels that the Government has not sustained his army.

To this the President replies, on the 28th:

"If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you.

"Save your ammy at all events. Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day."

The 28th of June passed without any serious fighting. Col. B. S. Alexander testifies that on the afternoon of that day he was sent for by Gen. Mc-Clellan, and went to his headquarters, at Savage's Station, arriving there about dark. He received instructions to proceed with an escort to the James River, send back a sufficient number of men to act as guides for the different columns of the army, communicate with the gunboat-, and order supplies to be brought up the river: to examine both shores of the James to the mouth of the Chickahominy, and ascertain the landing places; proceed up the Chickahominy to the head of navigation and ascertain the places where the army could cross, in case of necessity, and then return to headquarters and report. He left Savage's Station that night, and reached the James River the next afternoon. By the time he had completed his examination the army had reached the James River at Malvern.

M'CLELLAN PROPOSES TO DESTROY HIS BAG-GAGE.

While at headquarters, receiving his instructions, he was shown, as he testifies, a printed order, not then issued, directing the destruction of the baggage of officers and men, and the tents, camps, equipage, and things of that kind; appealing to the army to submit to this privation, as it would be only temporary—"only for a few days." He remon-strated with Gen. McClellan against issuing such an order; that it would have a bad effect, would demoralize the army, as it would be telling them more plainly than they could be told in any other way that they were defeated and running for their lives. The order was not issued, and Gen. McClellan testifies that he has no recollection of any such order. THE RETREAT TO JAMES RIVER.

The retreat to the James River having been dccided upon, the army took up its march, being attacked by the enemy in the day time, and however successful in repelling those attacks, evacuating their positions during the night. The actions of Savage a Station, Glendale and Malvern were fought during the movement of the army to the James, the onemy being repulsed in each day's fighting, and our army falling back, under orders, during the

It would appear, from all the information your Committee can obtain, that the battles were fought, the troops handled, new dispositions made and old ones changed, entirely by the corps commanders, without directions from the Commanding General. He would place the troops in the morning, then leave the field and seek the position for the next day, giving no directions until the close of the day's fighting, when the troops would be ordered to full back during the night to the new position selected by him. In that manner the army reached the James River.

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

The battle of Malvern Hill, of the 1st of July. was the most fiercely contested of any upon the peninsula. The troops were placed in the morning, under direction of Gen. McClellan, who then left the field, returning to it again in the ofternoon. first action of the day commenced about 10 o'clock in the forenoon, but did not continue long. principal action, when the enemy attacked most vigorously and persistently, commenced late in the afternoon, and continued till after dark, the enemy being repulsed and beaten at every point. Many of the officers examined by your Committee are of the opinion that the enemy were so severely punished on that day that they could have been followed into Richmond had our army followed them up vigorously.

It is true that our army had been severely tried during the preceding week, fighting, as they did, nearly every day, and retreating every night. corps commanders and the trops under them fought most bravely—no troops better. However disheartened they may have become by what all must bave regarded as a precipitate retreat during the night, they still fought with the most obstinate bravery when attacked in the day time by an exultant and

successful enemy.

M'CLELLAN STILL RETREATS.

The commanding general, however, determined to fall back from Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwithstanding the victory won there by our army. seems to have regarded his army as entirely unfitted to meet the enemy, for on the day of the battle at Malvern, evidently before that battle took place, he writes to the Adjutant-General of the army from Haxall's plantation.

AND STILL WANTS TROOPS.

" My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboata can render more aid in covering our position. Permit me to nrge der more aid in covering our position. Permit me to nrge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed."

On the 2d of July the President telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

McClellan:

"Your dispatch of yesterday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you for a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you must surely labor under some gross mistae of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last Spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find included in and about Washingtou 75,000 men. Now please be assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of Gen. Fremont's in the valley; all of Gen. Banks's; all of Gen. McDondt's not will you; and all in Washington taken tryether do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000, with Gen. Wo Land Gen. Dix added to those menti-med. I have not outside of your army 75,000 men cast of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000 men, or any other considerable force, frompuly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of rep pusibilities, you had the impression that I blame you for netwoing more unanyou can please be releved of such impression. I only beg that in like mamner you will not ask impossibilities of me.

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Savethe army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offen sive ggin as fast I can."

On the 3d of July, after the army had reached

On the 3d of July, after the army had reached

Harrison's Bar, Gen. McClellan writes to the Secretary of War:

"I am in hopes that the enemy is as completely worn out as we are; he was certainly very severely punished in the last hattle. It is, of course, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but I

doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men

"To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond, and putting an end to this rebellion, re-enforcements should be went me rather much over than less than 100,000 men."

THE ARMY HELPLESS.

The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrison's Bar was very precipitate. The troops, upon their arrival there, were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army being collected within a space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the hights which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artiflery, saved the army there from destruction. The enemy discrete in bringing up some of their artiflery, and threw some shells into the camp, before any preparations for defense had been made. On the 3d of July the hights were taken possession of by our troops and works of defense commenced, and then, and not until then, was our army secure in that position.

NUMBER OF TROOPS.

By reference to the testimony of Mr. Tucker, Assistant-Secretary of War, it will be seen that prior to the 5th of April, 1862, 121,500 men had been landed on the penincula. Shortly afterward Gen. Franklin's division of Gen. McDowell's corps, numbering about 12,000 men, was sent down. In the early part of June Gen. McCall's division, of the same corps, of about 10,000 men, was sent down, together with about 11,000 men, from Baltimore and Fortress Monroe, and about the last of June. some 5,000 men of Gen. Shields's division were also sent down. Total, 159,500 men. On the 20th of July, 1862, according to the returns sent to the Adjutant-General's office by Gen. Me-

Clellan, the Army of the Potomac, under his command, was as follows: Present for duty, 101,691; special duty, sick, and in arrest, 17,828; absent, 38,-795; total, 158,314. This included the corps of Gen. Dix, amounting to 9,997, present for duty, or in all,

11,778 men.

M'CLELLAN IDLE.

The army remained at Harrison's Bar during the month of July and a part of August. It engaged in no active operations whatever, and was almost entirely unmolested by the enemy. The subject of the future operations of the army was a matter of much deliberation on the part of the Government. Gen. McClellan claimed that the James River was the true line of approach to Richmond, and that he should be re-enforced in order to renew the cam-paign against that place. The President visited the army about the 8th of July, but nothing was then decided upon.

HIS ARMY ENERVATED.

On the 25th of July Gen. Halleck visited the army at Harrison's Bar, accompanied by Gen. Burnside, who had come from North Carolina, with the greater portion of his force, to Fortress Monroe. The general officers were called together, and the question of withdrawing the army was submitted to them. The council was of rather an informal character. The majority of the officers expressed tuemselves in favor of a withdrawal of the army. Gen. Burnsido testifies that, as he understood from the officers there. the army was not in a good condition, sickness was increasing, many of the regiments were without shelter and cooking utensils, and many of the men were without arms. The general opinion expressed by the leading officers was that the men had become very much enervated. One of the leading officers said that his command could not, in his opinion, march three miles and fight a battle. This condition of the troops was one of the reasons assigned for the final withdrawal of the army from the neuronly.

M'CLELLAN'S DEMAND FOR RE-ENFORCEMENTS. Gen. McClellan applied for 50,000 re-enforcements to enable him to resume active operations. Gen. Hallick, when he visited the army, informed Gen. McClellan that the Government could furnish him only 20,000 additional troops. Gen. McCtellan consented to renew operations with that number of reenforcements, and Gen. Huileck 1 t with that understanding. But the day that he left Gen. McClellan wrote'to him, asking for 15,000 or 20,006 troops from the Western army, in addition to those promised to him, urging very strongly that they should be brought here temporarily, to be returned to the West after Richmos I should have been taken. As this could not be done, the order was given for the withdrawal of the army as rapidly as possible, in order to . co-operate with tab forces under Gen. Pope, then in the presence of a superior for a of the enemy.

M'CLELLAN'S TESTIMONY.

In regard to the re-enforcement of the army while Harrison's Landing, the testimony of Gen. Mc-Clellan is as follows:

"Question. How many available men did you estimate that you had at Harrison's Ber, and how many more would you have required in order to undertake a movement successfully

upon Richmond?

"Answer, I think I had about 35,000 or 90,000 men at Har-Answer, I turnst land about 60000 or 90000 men at Har-rison's Bar, and would have undertaken mother movement in advance with about 20.00 more re-enforcemen's. My viow was that pretty much overything that the Government could have controlled ought to have been massed on the James River. I did not believe the enemy would troable Washing-River. I did not beneve the enemy would trouble washing-ton so long as we had a powerful army in the vicinity of Rich-mond, and did not share the apprehensions for the safety of Washington that were entertained by a g-eat many.

Washington that were entertained by ag eat many. "I asked for 50 000 men at first, onthe ground that I thought the army should be made as atrong as pessible, and as little as possible left to chance. When Gen Halleck came down to Harrison's Bar, my recollection is that he said that 20,000 men, or something about that number, was all that could be had, and I said that I would try it again with that number. I have no recollection of having asked at a subsequent period for a greater number than 20,000 as a necessary preliminary to

for a greater innihilat than 25,000 as a necessary plenting of a movement.

"Question. About how many men had been lost from the 25th of June until you reached Harrison's Bar, in killed, wounded, and missing?

"Answor, I think the loss was about 14,000; but I could

"Answer. I think the loss was about 1,000; but I could not tell positively without looking at the returns.

"Question. Will you state in what your chances for success would have been greater, with the addition of 20,000 men to the number which you had at Harrison's Landing, than they were in front of Richmend, and before Jackson had formed a junction with the stoft he enemy's forces?

junction with the rest of the enemy slottees?

"Answer, I should have counted upon the effect of the battles, which had just taken place, upon the enemy. We had then strong reasons to believe that the enemy's losses had been very much heavier than our own, and that portions of his army were very much demoralized, especially after the battle of Malvern Hill."

GEN. BARNARD'S REPORT.

In closing their report upon the campaign of the Peninsula, your Committee would refer to the report of Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers of the Army of the Potomac during that campaign, made to Gen. McClellan. The conclusion of his report, which he terms "a retrospect pointing out the mistakes that were made, and thus tracing the causes of its (the Peninsular campaign's) failure to their true sources," is as follows:

CAUSES OF M'CLELLAN'S FAILURE.

" One of the prominent among the causes of ultil mate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months, the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial state of riege by a greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of

150,000 men.
"In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk could and should have been taken. The Navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the Merrimac,

which proved so disastrous to our sn'sequent operadions, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the X..vy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it

"Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it has been shown that successful war involves comething more than abstract military principles. The true question was to seize the first practicable moment to ratis y the, perhaps, unreasonable but natural longing of an ambailous nation for results to justry is lavi-h could leuce, and to take adliberty of action while they were po sessed.

"When the army did move, a plan was adopted perfectly certain to invite, nay, compel, interference, and when the army was to go by Aumapois to the lower Che-apeake, I felt confident that one-half would secreely have been embarked before the other half would have been ordered back to Washington. The enemy was then at Manassas, and a femit, even if not reality, of an attack upon Woshi agon was so obvious, so certain to create a porty, which no Executive could resist that incorporate with the removal of the rest of the army was certain.

"When the enemy felt look behind the Rappa-hannock, and destroyed their ilroad bridges, the circumstances were greatly channel, and there were strong armune, is for the line adopted. Yet, results have proved how many reasons there were to be connave proven now many reasons to rewere to be considered, lessed the jurely railing ones, which opposed themselves to the adoption of such a fine.

The facts connected with the withholding of Me-

Dowell's come have been so come to yentifite lin the proceedings of the Me Dowell Court of Lequity, that every one who wish a can form his em julg-ment. We sharm twas vise or nawise, it was one of those thorsase it right in the today of a line of operations which did not be over Washington.

operations which did it is the roov of Wildlington. "At the time the Army of the Polinians land on the Polinian at the Richelmany what is it west the. Its armide where centralized thy the different Political Royal, Mill Bridge, Port Heavy, Fort Dueskon, Romoko Libad, and Pea Ridge; and redwed by sickness, loss in hait of captures and redwed by sickness, loss in hait of captures as of pariods of service, deal, while the Conseil for low was not set on passed, to remaid as if it models but one vigorous gropping all for weather redshout the day of the initiation of the capture properties that the day of the initiation of the Conseil and the first statement of the Polenians was the dry of the reask, its first of the Robelciuse, which is all 10 grow years. tion of the Robelciuse, which a held o grow para

tion of the Robelciuse, which is the lip grow para passa with the slow paragrees of a constituent "However I may be obtained to have expression of professional epinion to the contemps (I certainly didented in it, payopt ion not is that the lims of Yorkeway that the lims elementaries). There is reason to like the tatthey were not like in the is reason to like that they were not like it is reason to like the reason paragraph of the whole of a reason paragraphs of the constitution of the paragraphs of power, the reason complete. The passing of power, the reason of the international was due to emissive the content in the standard field. It is yould be one of which the the cock of an unit of the life of the late of the life is the trendes, or "Our thought like a reason that the trendes, or

then the four scripting.

"Our trought Had a noth it distrembes, or lay in the four of the four way. A well at few in a by the single, in description a familiar id of the army, and tell and famile, a note send by the excitement of consequent in a tell that carry with terms of the transfer of the fine and pained by the charge we have tated to our hearts content. They are not yet exhausted.

"The size Laving I ou determined upon, we abould have opened our barrenes on the place as fast as they were completed. The effection the troops as they were completed. The ences on the croops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the riege and a cottened our labors; and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas,

us it was, we only induced him to evacuate or prodential reasons.

"Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to jursue the enemy with our whole force. But the battle of Williamsburg, fought, as it was, without reconnectering the position, without concert of action among the different corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a blun-

Comminders, and almoss without others, which ought not to have happened.

"We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, it knew it was forthern. To might have been rate, in the enemy made a stard there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get histranes out of our reach. We fought; we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we lend not fought, the next day a battle would in all mobability have been unnecessary. But if it had been accessary, we should have had time to have brought up our resources, reconncitered the position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some result would have flowed from it.
"We had every advantage. Franklin's division

landed at West I out ou the next day, and Sedgwick's division on the day following. These two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, coald have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front and have had two givisons in his year. His Lasty retreat, and Jerhans his capture, must incvir-ably have followed, and the great object of Hearing Franklin so long on barked, and finally studing him

to West Point, would have been accomplished.
On Leaving Williamsburg we should have close? the Chickahominy, and connected with the navy in the Chickahominy, and connected with the navy in the dances liver. We should then have had a united army, in 1 the cooperation of the navy, and probably would have been in Richmond in two weeks. The first that we did not know the character of the Chillahominy as an obstrole (as it by across our dithe York River, and that the railroat furnished a got breats of with M.D. well coming from Predecies. burg, Est, determined our route. In taking it we lost easen inly all that was worth going to far to gran, viz: the James River ap roach and the cooperation of the Lavy.

"The route chosen, two weeks should not have lecurpeat in traversing the forty miles from William-burg to Butom's and New Bridges; and the But for of the Car kahoming being letting unguarded at But on's Bridge, no time should have been lest in making who critic circumstance to turn and reize the parage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the SSh of May, and even callier, had me sares been pressed and prepared for it.

"Inerepulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have lear taken a lyantage of. It was one of those one of those one which if not exist, do not repeat themselve. We now know the title of its against in stration may in which the letter the special to the transport and. We reach how that it could have been a lowed into R.C. mend. Had it been so, there would have been min. All hough wa diluct the lung over curright win. All hough wa diluct the almost that when the reads it was a true that the that when the He can and the Unwatourleftwin a they can be leaded in the care suctions and the Chyatourleftwin a they can not leave any means in their heads unused for care suctes. It was children and the conditions are possible to the condition of the with the while from an dyst we regulated the inforcement of a with the children of ours. We headed have followed them up at the came time that we brought over the other two-filths.

"After it was known that McDowell was called off to another quarter, there was no longer hope of an increase of lone by the janction of his corpe. There were no other re-enforcements to look for byyou I what we received by the middle of the month of June. The Rebel force was known or supposed to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the iaflax of troops from other parts, and by the breaking

up of Beauregard's army.

"At list the moment came when action was im-

perative. The enemy testinal to a scatter. We had carning if where a declare he was to streke. Had Porter because the advance he was to streke. Had Porter because the advance he was to streke. Had Porter because the season of the Co. Indicately Rever, wide the right beach of the Co. Indicately Rever, wide two corps, of had to the completion of the composition to the last to the last of the composition to the last of the composition of the composition of the composition of the composition of the season of a three last of the first; and in the composition of t of the Or chahoming, we might have fought and crushed the coung on the lift book, we pread our communication, and then returned and taken Richmond.

Mond.

"As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force—except enough life before our lines to keep up as appearance—and we fought with \$7,000 men, so that we knine a battle and \$9,000 men. By this of fact we were driven from our postum, our advance for conquest turned into a retreat for safet j by a force prob-

ably net greatly superier to our own.
"In view of the length of time which our operations before Richmond consumed, there is now no doubt that the depot at the White House should have been fortified, as well as one or two points on the railroad thence to the Chickalominy; that the tete-de-pout at Bottom's Bridge should have been completed, and likewise teles-de-pont, or strong positions, prepared to cover the deboucks from our bridges to the left bank of the Chickshominy. With these the army would have possessed freedom of motion to concentrate on either side, and the disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have

occurred.

"When the army reached the James River it needed no prothet to predict the disasters which have since betaller our country's cause. If the army bad sust ided i solf nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil, and so much disaster, had deprived it of the &'an which results from sucman deprived the table at which results from successalone. Is was, moreover, as well as our forces elsewhere, sady diminish d in numbers. On the other hand, the whole army, from its first low state, had ricen up an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success. Had its number, indeed, approached to that attributed to in-20% D nea-there is little doubt that a march upon Wachington would have speedily followed our will be awal to the James.

"From such considerations, as well as those fol-lowing from the results of the past operations, I counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with our forces covering Wash-

James to reduce in ington."

The report of Gen. Bannard is the only report of Charles are not the Peninsula the officers engaged in the campaign of the Peninsula Tao report which your Committee have obtained. by the communing general has not yet been made, and the reports of his subscinates have not been sent by him to the Department.

CO-OPERATION WITH GEN. POPE.

Gen. Burnside, with Lis commun. I, was the first to leave the perincula. He hads I at Acquia and proceeded to Fredericksburg, relieving God. King, who created the control of the control proceeded to Frederi Esburg, Filewing Gal, King, who proceeded at once to rejoin his cirja (McDowell's) then with Gen. Pope. Soon after, Gen. Burnside was ordered to send all peciels whistance to Gen. Pope, and at once ordered two of his three divisions (Peno's and Stevens's) up the Rappahaunock. Sherdy after that the advalles of the army of the Potomae, I'i z John Porter's cor; ; reached Acquia, and was sent forward by Ger. Burnside to Gen. Pope. The rest of the Army of the Petermae. except K yes's corps, left to g miss; Yorktown, proceeds to Alemanoria, and from the eq. i. 1 Gen. P. p. Gen. Summer stopped at Acquite older arked a portion of discorps there; has been trade. Frate resublished an again and proceed to Alexandria, with headed.

i so , s. ent to the assistance of G. c. P. envere or a scenario manassime of G. S. P. S. were a configuration of the second of the secon content of the second of

vali itisaa . 3 yesogivantaro ("thin. Bio common erro orch twalitho on enrocach (whith compain The compared twich the compared of the Army of Verbillands and the compared by the Army of Verbillands and the constitution of the Army of the Compared of the transport of the lin's corps from Alexandr a to the assistance of Gen.

M'CLELLAN'S DELAYS IN SENDING ASSISTANCE. At 1) a. m., Aug. 27, Gen. Halleck telegraphs Gen. McClellan that

"Frank!in's corps should march in that direction (Manassas) as soon as possible."

At 10:40 a. m. Gev. McClellan replies:

"I have sent orders to Franklinto proper a to match with his corps at one; and to reparrhers (dex ridria) in persents inform limes to his means of transportation. It may was yes, endry at happinn order for craft feation. Keily's, Burnottle, &c. Sanner will commonce reaching Falmouth today?

At 12 m. on the same day Gen. Halleck telegraphs. to Gen. McCl. ilan:

"Telegrams from Gen. Porter to Gen. Burnside, just received, say that Barkars at Fayerteville. Medianed, Sigel, and Richarts, he of Warcerton: Remonths into. Porter is much lag on Warrenton to recent callops. A white said of H intrahman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Frankand sorphismall involved they forced for relied calling the order working of the supplied, as far as possible, by railroad."

From Gen. McClellon to Gen. Halleck, same day,

sent 12:5 p. m., received 1:10 p. m.:

"My oid has just returned from Gen. Franklin's cump. Report at an Edward Franklin, Saith, and Schan, an all in Washin dom. How we the order to the next in tank to place the corps to readless to move the ones."

From same to same, sent 1:15 p. m., received

1:50 p. 14.

1:50 p. 11.

"Prinkin's artillery has no herses, except for ionr gund without endone. I can pick up no creaty. In view of these feet, will it not bowell to pain dumant's corps here by with entry they assembly to me what either arrangement for picking to what is not in the clinic arrangement of the control of the control

At 1:50 p. m. Gen. Hallock replies:

West Thinks' monether that a bould come to Alexadria. The enemy hand parties have a full the commending officer that has been partied in the result of the results of the r

On he morning of the Milds of August, Gen. Hal-lock telegraphs to Gen. Franklin:

"On patting with Geo. It Callin, about two o'clock this morning town undersond and you were to move which your court deep township from the realizable that the dense has retricted to Meximina. If you have not received this decided and derived to Meximina. If you have not received this ore, detailed.

At 1:05 p. m. of the same day, the 23th, Gen. Mc-Clallan telegrapia to Gen. Halliek:

"Your dispatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possels to burry artiflety and cavelry. The moment franches can be started with a reasonable amount of artiflery

nard, and be sure the works towerd Chain Bridge are perfectly seems. I look upon those works, especially Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance."

At 3:39 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellau:

"Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible toward Mamssas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is ne-enforced."

At 4:45 p. m. Gen. McClellan replies:

"Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Summer's corps is now in condition to more and tight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. In we sent aides would be a sacrines to send them out how. In we sent ances to ascertain the condition of the commands of Gox and Tylor, but Is ill think that a promuture movement in small force will accomplish a shing but the description of the troops sent out. I repeat that I will less no time in preparing the troops now herefor the field, and that whatever orders you may give, after healing what I have to say, will be carried out."

At 8:40 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Mausses; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our nid. If there is a want of wagons, to men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

Additional Company of McClallen telegraphs:

At 10 r. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to mach at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery here."

At 10:30 a. m. of the 29th, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck:

graphs to Gen. Hinnech:

"Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 6 a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. * * * * * If Summer moves in support of Frankin, it leaves as without only taskworthy troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too much after. What shall be done? Have but three squadroos belonging to the Army of the Potomac. Franklin has but firty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to more more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night."

At 12 m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation."

In another dispatch of same date he telegraphs:

"Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?

At 3 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Mc-Clellan?

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find cut something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandate as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassa, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses."

At 2:40 p. m. the President asks of Gen. Mc-Clellan:

"What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What, generally?"

At 2:45 p. m., received 3:30 p. m., Gen. McClellan replies:

lan replies:

"The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stranglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centrevitle and retring toward Thoroughiare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, To concentrate all our evail the forces to open communication with Pope. Second, To leave Pope to get out of his strape, and at once use ell means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. This mowhat you wish me to do, and I will do all it may have to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders a deauthority are. In kit, we bring, but will obey whichever orders you give. I called the provided of the course of the course

At 4.10 p. m. the President replica:

At 4.10 p. m. U.e President replice:
"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit: 'to concer r.to all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one. But I wish not counted."
That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels,"

FRANKLIN'S DISOBEDIENCE. At 7.50 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McCiellan:

"You will immediately send construction train and guards "An will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Frankfin's corns stopped at Anandala, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas."

M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR IT.

To this Gen. McClellan replies, at 8 p. m., received 8.50 p. m.:

"It was not self for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of common v. * * * In regard to to-moriow's movements of cales definite instructions, naitia not accessible to me to be accused of disobeving orders. as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me."

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin to place himself in communication with Gen. Pope, by advancing as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's supplies."

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan forwards to Gen. Halleck a dispatch received from Gen. Franklin at Anandale, dated 7:15 p.m., in which Gen. Franklin gives rumors concerning the battle of that day, closing thus:

"Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the country will not support him."

At 5 a. m. of the 30th of August Gen. Pope sent a dispatch to Gen. Halleck, received at 3.30 p. m., from battle-field near Groveton, Virginia, containing an account of the battle of the day before, and closing as follows:

M'CLELLAN REFUSES SUPPLIES TO POPE.

"I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's, and Stargis's regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from Gen. Franklin, written by order of Geo. McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be baded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment. Will you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centreville?"

At 9.40 a. m. Angust 30 Gen. Hallack telegraphs.

At 9.40 a. m., August 30, Gen. Hallock telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"I sam by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandalo. Moreover, I learned last night that the Quartermaster's Department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had spplied for it, any time since Lis strival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Popo's army, and should have acted more promptly."

At 11 a. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

" Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Clain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia Pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court-House, if this is the roate you wish them to take. Ho and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?"

At 12:20 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs:

"I think Couch should land at Alexandria, and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the flighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time. * * Send transports to Acquia to bring; up Buruside's command. I have telegraphed to him, and am awaiting his answer."

At 2:15 r. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs:

Frankin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible dispatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is everything."

At 5 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. H.lleck:

"Major Hammerstein of my staff reports, from two miles this side of Cetreville, at 1:30 p. m., that Franklin's corps was then advancing rapidly. Summer's corps moved at 1:45 p. m. The orderly who brought the dispatch from Hammerstein states that he camed that the fighting commenced five miles beyond Centreville, and that our people had been driving them all day. Hammerstein says all he loarns was favorable."

At 10:10 p. m. Gen Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"All of Summer's Corps on the south side of the river, not actually required in the forts, should march to Pope's relief

Replace them with new regiments. Franklin should also be hurried on to recenforce Pope."

On the same day-Aug. 30, hour not given-McClellan gent the following to Gen. Halleck.

"Ever since Gen. Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition. But he was uniformly told by the Quarterm-sters here that there was note disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, at 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured 20 wegons to e-try a portion of his ammunition, by utloading some of Gen. Banke's supply train for that purpose.
"Gen. Summer was one entire duyla endeavoring, by application upon Quartermasters end others, to get a sufficient number of vagons to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march without it.
"I have this morning sent ell my headquaters train that is landed to be at one loaded with ammunition for Summer and Franklin, but they will not co far toward supplying the defi-"Ever since Gen. Franklin received notice that he was to

Franklin, but they will not go far toward supplying the defi-

Frankin, but they will not go lar towar supragraciency.

"Lighty-five wagons were got together by the Quartermasfer last hight, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under
an escort at I a. ra., via Alexandria.

"Every effort has been made to earry out your instructions
promptly. The oilficulty seems to consist in the fact that
the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria
and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the
garrisons. At all events, such is the state of the case as represented to me by the Quartermaster, and it appears to be
true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly exulatined to you."

At 10:45 a. m. of the 31st of August, Gen. Pope sends the following to Gen. Halleck from Centreville:

seems the following to teen. Hatteck from Centreville:

"One troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and vern out. I think it would, perhaps, have been greatly better if Summer and Frenklin had been here three or four days are. But you may rely upon our giving them (the enemy) as desperate a light as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington, should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry recouncissance in our front at Cub Run, whether in edvance of an attack to-day I don't yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose."

On the 2d of September Gen. Pope was ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his army came under the command of Gen. McClellan.

M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR POPE'S DEFEAT.

The following is from the testimony of Gen. Halleck.

"Question. Had the Army of the Peniosula been brought to co-operate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?
"Answer, I thought so at the time, and still think so."

Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so."

In relation to the command of Gen. McClellan, he himself testifies as follows:

"Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of Gen. Pope?

"Answer. I was for some little time—one or two days, two

"Answer. I was for some little time—one or two days, two or three days, perhaps—without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the let of September, I received verbal Instructions from Gen. Italeck to take command of the defenses of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under Gen. Pope. I think it was on the next day after that I was instructed verbally by the President and Gen. Italeck to go out and meet the army which was coming in and to assume command of it when it when it which was coming io, and to assume command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly."

The testimony of Gen. Halleck upon the same point is as follows:

"Question. What was the position of Gen. McClellan in regard to the troops of the Army of the Potemac as they landed at Acquia Creek and Alexandria? Were they under his command; and if so, how long aid they remain under his command?

commind:
"Answer. Gen. McClellan retained the command of
the Army of the Potennae as it landed at those
two points, except such portions of it as were sent
into the teldunder Gen. Pope. Those portions were considered as tempor andy detached from his command, but etil belonging to his surny, and he was directed that all orders sent from him to the toops as detached, while under Gen. Popels immediate command, must be sent through too headquaters at Washington. He retained command of all tho troops of his army as they haded at those phoce must entiate the feel, and reported to be. Popels and tray continued to remain under his command, with the exception of his detachments, until Gen. Pope's army fell back on Washington, when all came under Gen. McClcllan's command. On his (Gen. McClellan's) arrival at Alexandria he was told totake immediate command of all the troops in end about Washing-ton, in addition to thoso which properly belonged to the Army of the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbally directof the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbilly directed to take such command he saked for a formal order, which was issued from the Adjutant-General's office. The order i sued from the Adjutant-General's clice was after Gen. Pope's army commenced falling back, and was dated Sept. 2; but Gen. McClelan had been in command ever since his arrivaled. val in Alexandria.

valin Alexandria.
"Question, At what time did he arrive in Alexandria?
"Answer. He arrived at Alexandria on the 26th of August.
The tormal order was i-sued that he might have no difficulty with Gen. Pope's forces; that they might have no difficulty with Gen. Pope's forces; that they might not question his authority."

THE CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND.

Very soon after Gen. Pope and his army fell back on Washington the Rebel army entered Maryland. Preparations were immediately made by the authorities in Washington to follow them.

In relation to the command of the army in Maryand your Committee will quote from the testimony of Gen. McClellan and Gen. Halleck. The testimony of Gen. McClellan is as follows: The testi-

"Question. What position did you occupy after your errival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of Gen.

Pope? "Answer. I was for some little time—one or two days, two or three days, perhaps—without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from Gen. Halleck September, I received verbal instructions from Gen. Halleck to take command of the defenses of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under Gen. Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and Gen. Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position which I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly.

M'CLELLAN FORGETS.

"Question. How long did you remain in command of the defenses of Washington, and what orders did you next receive, and from whom?
"Answer. I do not think that order, assigning the defenses of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other one issued in its place. I had only verbal communications with Gen. Halleck before I started on the Antietam campaign. And it was never definitely decided, up to the time that I left, as to whether I was to go or not. I asked the question two or three times of Gen. Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it had not been determined. And I do not think that it ever was. I think that was one of these things that growinto shape itself. When the time came I went out."

The following is the testimony of Gen. Halleck.

The following is the testimony of Gen. Halleck

nnon that point:

"Question. By whose orders was Gen. McClellan placed in command of the army that left Washington to operate in Maryland; and were these orders verbal or in writing? "Answer. As I stated the other day, the order was given verbally to Gen. McClellan by the President, at Gen. MicClellan's house, about 9 o'clock in the morning, previous to Gen. Mo-

lan's house, about 9 o'clock in the morning, previous to Gen. Mo-Clellan leaving the city for Rockville.
"I will add that Gen. McClellan, in virtue of his being placed in command of the fortifications of Washington and the troops for defense within them, was really in command of all the troops here at that time. The question was discussed by the President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops that were to go into the tield. The decision was made by himself, and announced to Gr.n. McClellan in my presence. I did not know what the decision was until I heard it thus announced."

M'CLELLAN FORGETS AGAIN.

In regard to the instructions given to Gen. McClellan his testimony is as follows:

"Question. Did you have any interview with the President in relation to taking command of the troops for the Maryland campaign, or receive any instructions from him on that

point:
"Answer. Id) not think he gave meany instructions after
that morning, when I was told to take command of the army
in front of Washington. I do not think he gave meany instructions about the Maryland campaign.
"After you commenced the movement, did you receive any
instructions from any one?"

"After you commenced the movement, did you receive my instructions from any one of "Answer. I received some telegrams, that might be looked upon in the nature of instructions, from Gen. Halleck and from the President. The general tener of Hallecks dispatches was that I was commetting an error in gong so far away from Hashing their, the I was going rather to fast. He had the impession that the main force of the enemy was on the south ado of the Promag, and that they had only a small face in front of me to draw me on, and then they would come find by Washington in rear. As late as the 13th of Sept mier, I reconcert a telegram of Gen. Halleck in which he pressed that same idea, and told me that I was wrong in going so far awey." going so far away."

The testimony of Gen. Hadeck upon that point is

"Chesten, Witting etiens, However region to Con. McClainta regulitations and of the angle of the production o McChamia regulitation content of the all problems of a marker. The drythe first for the first that discussions to the all problems to the first that discussions to the first that the angeone and the first that the fi

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The Litter of Gen. Halleck of Sept. 13, referred to by Gen. McClellan, is as follows:

by Gen. McClellan, is as follows:

"Sent 10:15 a.m.
"War Dupartment,
"Major Gen. McClellan; Yours of Schop. in., yesterdey, is just received. Gen. Panks cannot sadily spire ciple
new regimen's from here. You in as temember that vity
faw troops are now received in in the North, nonfy all being
stope et for and the railro. I. Tour retinents were ordered
to Gen. Dic to replace Folks division. Portriblancay
getterdry are 20/01. Until you know more extally the
enemyful res south of the Northman you are went; in thus
sen. I a small column to Pouncylvinia, so as to draw your
threes in that direction, then suddenly more on Warington
with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross
ever:

"In your letter of the Hth you attach too little importance "In your letter of the Hill you atter too liftle importance to the end it. It is any you that you a verne, "the capture of this piece will throw us beek six ment, a lift is fould not destroy us. However of the exist in now point otheroy in. You saw then when here, but you seem to forget them in the distance. No many troops can be reat from here till we have fresh arrivals com the North."

MICLELLAN PROPOSES TO SACRIFICE WASH-INGTON.

The let'er from Gen. McClellan, of the 11th, to which then. Halleck here refers, contains the fol-

"I believe this army fully appreciates the importance of a

"Thelivo this army fully appreciates the importance of a vic cry at trission, and will light well; but the result of a vic cry at trission, and will light well; but the result of a vic cry at trission, and will light well; but the result of a vic cry at trission, and will light well; but the result of a very light and if we stood the desired and a vic vic victor of the country which had a victor is the extreme. Under these circumstances, I would necessary a victor of the three army corps now on the for made, exposed to he days a mass truct to becaute of the property will higher head a victor of the trick of the trick of the victor of the vict range, reports there is easy to be intended provered to defeat as, could left that forces move around A sabing on its sufficient to prove them? I a victorious along from carrying the workern this side of the Potomao after they are uncovered by our struck? I think not."

Your Commentes having gone so fully into the de-tails of the Pathicula campaign, do not deen it introduction the page of the expanding in Maryland. The sense which that control it ore in haryland, the sense which that control it ore in haryland, the terms general feature of neader-iest was a contributed of consecution of the elec-trophic of any conditions or wrathness to make particular of the ore of the consecution of the re-cues to the prest appearancy of numbers on the past of the consecution of manbers of the expanding paper. Your Committee boying gone so fully into the do-

HARPER'S FERRY.

In relation to the currenter of Harper's Ferry, your Committee have not deemed it necessary to take my feet, the military contained which was one native the city in Contact that the current is a subject. October has fully investigat a time might, and their report has been given to the quille. Attention is called merely to two telegrams of Sect. 11, which pass distance from McClellan and Gen. Halleck, and which are as follows:

"ROCKVILLE, Sept. 11-9:45 a. m. "Col. Miles is at or near Hipper's Larry, I used restand, with the hard Hipper's Larry, I used restand, with the hard hard hard he of great retyies if ordered to have here. I remeat the the boordered at once to join melly the most precise his route. "GDO, B. McC Libell, Wi, "Milyn-Caneral Commanding, "Milyn-Caneral Commanding, "Hisjor-Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief."

"Washinoton, D. C., Sept. 11, 101:—Bent 2:20 p.m. }

"Washinoton, D. C., Sept. 11, 101:—Bent 2:20 p.m. }

"Thero is no way for Col. Miles to Jonyou at present. The only clarge is to dend the works until you can open a communication with him. When you do so, ho will be subject to your orders.

"Well ALLECK."
"General-in-Chief.

" M. jor-Gen. McClellan, Rockvide."

SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

On the 14th of September the battle of South Mountain was fought—the troops at Turner's Gap being under command of Gen. Burnside, and those at Crampton's Gap being under the command of Gen. Franklin-reculting in the enemy retiring to the vicinity of Shepherdstown.

ANTIETAM.

On the 17th of September the battle of Antietam was fought. It was commenced by Gen. Hooker on the right, at dawn, our troops driving the enemy before them, and gailing an important position. When Gen. Hooker was wounded and taken from the field, Gen. Sumner took command of our right. Can. Summer had been ordered to held his corps in readinees to advance an hour before daylight, but did not receive the order to advance until 7:20 in the morring. Gen. Mansfield, who had come up to the support of Gen. Hooker, had been killed. Our has support of Gen. Hooser, and teen Rilled. Our troops, seeing their leaders fall, and being very heavily pressed by the enemy, were forced back for some distance from the advanced position Gen. Hooker had mached; but finally, with the assistance of the troops brought up by Gen. Sammer, checked the enemy's progress and maintained their position. On the left, Gen. Burnside, about 10 o'clock, was

ordered to attack the enemy at the bridge across the Actietam in his front, and to effect a crossing there. The advance of Gen. Burnside was met by a most obstinute resistance on the part of the enemy, and it Was not until 13 o'clock that the brilgs was carried. By 3 o'clock Gen. Barnside's whole command had crossed and taken position on some clevated ground in the boys the bridge. He was then ordered to take the hights commacting the town of Shepherdstown, which was done after desperato fighting. By that time the cremy on our left had been re-enforced by withdrawing some of their troops from opposite our right, where our advance had been checked, and Gan. Burnside was compelled to give up some of the ground ho had succeeded in occupying. He had send to Gen. McClell, a for re-enfercements, but roceived in reply that there were none to be had, but he must hold the bridge at all hazards.

The corps of Gen. Fitz John Porter, in the center. wasnot brought into action at all. Gen. Hookerte-tifies that he had been given to understand that there were to be attacks made simultaneously on the meht. center, and lefe of our army. He attacked at dawn; but Gen. Barnside on the left was not ordered to at tack until 10 o'clock, and there was no attack made in the center by Gen. Porter.

M'CLELLAN ATTACKS BY DRIBLETS.

In regard to the manner of conducting the attack at Antietam, Gen. Summer testifies:

at Antietam, Gen. Summer testifies:

"I have always believed that instead of sending these troops into that a time in deiles as they may seat if Gen. McClellan be law incited much these 4 1,000 men on the left in the cite of one my, we could not have fine it to the whem that book in for the thete divisions of our term outlett—Burnsad's, Franklins, and Fristering. As it was, we we tan division effect only income in even one of my own devisions was freed out. The other two deviction enemy and tell their position. My interior at the time was to law proceed denticely on the releft and move down, bringing them right in front of Burnsade, Franklin and Potter.

Porter.
"Ouestion. And all escape for the enemy would have been

impossible?
Auswer. I think so."

The battle closed at dark, our array having gained some little advantages, it a heavy loss, but nothing decisive. The attack was not renewed the next day, the two armies o curving the post ions held by them at the close of the yesterday's haule.

WHY THE ATTACK WAS NOT RENEWED.

In relation to the policy of receiving the a tack on the day after the bartle, G.E. Mc./L.Han testilies:

on the day after the battle, G.D. Mccl. Han testifies:

"The next menning (he 12) I found that our issues been so practicate to a separation of the contained by a formation of the contained by the day of the contained by the formation of the contained by the formation of the fo 13.500

THE REBELS FIUDE MCLLLAN.

"Head emaged have veried to wife, the ket haybreak on the little bar if a work and the great according that the country is conditional efficiency in the residency and efficiency and thing is not briggin and they work and the major and troops a stream entity were illustrately excluding your part of the stream o

WHAT BURESTON THOUGHT.

The technology of Georgia Proposition on the subject of renewing the new Action the enemy the day after the batch, is as follower

or renewals to the construction of Gen. McClellan, or to key observed. It was a followed:

"Question. Fillyon expressing epision to Gen. McClellan, or to key observed. It was a relation to renewing the stack the extractly staffiely was opened at lying express?

"Answer Real expression expression to Gen. In the distriction on the subject. Alternay can are wiself in the first of an one of the subject. Alternay can are wiself in the observed against established the state of the staff of the first of a staff of the first of a staff of the first of a staff of the course of the staff of the staff of the course of the staff of the course of the staff

of ten first shall be the state of the state

FRANKLIN'S OPINION.

Gen. Franklin testifics:

" Question. Were you consulted in relation to renewing the attack the next day?

"Answer, When Gen, McClellan visited the right in the attent in the theorem in those differenced year thought in which was the brider church, which I thought comminded the word, and that if I callibe that it, we could drive the charge from the word spinet, which I thought comminded the word, and that if I callibe that it, we could drive the charge from the word spinet, the call the place the next more age, from Gen. Sometive of the call the properties of artiflers bearing upon it. We do not be comerly from four that attenton in a definition of the traveless of the charge of the order of the attention in a definition of the traveless of the charge of th " Answer, When Gon. McClellan visited the right in the

"Other west pressure were given by not making the stream in each not high state at many the article and hear the direct reason of the General Common rug, has been reducted that or an energy that he expected a free the malnes to the probability to be about a basic tenture, a certain thing and he protected to wait to make this attack on the right, until these new troops

"Onestion. And that delay gave the enemy an opportunity escope?
"Ausver, I think & did."

On the night of the 18th of September the enemy abandoned their politica and retried peros. the Potomic into Virginia, wi hour molesta lou. Our army elowly followed, a d too's up a position along the Poto mee, on the Maryla deide, olenograg Maryland Hi this on the 2 th, and Harper's Ferry on the 231.

LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES.

Gen. McCl Han, on the With of reptember, reports our Lice of South Mountain at 2000 at Anticiam, 12,460—15. I lices in both by Les 14,794. In relation to the bases of the enemy into the pose bottles, in killed, wounded, prisoner, and stragglers, Gen. McClellan stor:

"It may be saily co-chiled, therefore, that the Robel annual on the 13,000 of their best troops in their brief cample pain Moryland"

M'CLLLLAN WANTS MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS. Au r the bank of Anti-tam Gen. Il ti llan hed for resemble emmas, and ammonesed mination to formly Hardred Hights, in day a re-quisition on Gen. Walsworth, then in Was director, for 2.000 contrab n is for that purpose. On the 27th of September he writes to Cen. Halleck:

AND PROPOSES TO FORM A MILITARY SCHOOL. AND PROPOSES TO FORM A MEJITARY SCHOOL. "Myprocal paper is to be in the army a one as it how it tell a procapital for second, and vaccing the river of one invariant questions to the army should be set input of case to be one of a part of the property vesus to be one of the property of the case down along a large transfer of the process of the proces or covered it mand then already mandered, but he we can technical early papear remarker of two tamove new law can technical papear papear remarker of two tamove new law can technical papear law law can be restored to the charge of the law content of the charge of the law content la

"The appropriate of the property of the pure collistores the first the second of the property of the second of the

M'CLELLAN KUEPS HIS M. N. IN CAME

On the 7th of Caro' er G. . Hallock replies. for a forming to the dualt can ented in some of the Northern States Length

Northern States I clays:

"But your cannot all by the operations of the error for these dryfts. I have the wear and all a linear mention in the retified definition in our county of error in a few ways to the problem. The state is a type of interesting the trips of the state of the problem. "The state of the trips is not to suppose the error in the most of the state of the trips of the and seek to per in them. In section of the staff is in certified in certified. In section of the staff is in certified. The dryft of the staff is in certified, the staff is incorrected in the staff is in certified in certified in the staff is incorrected in the best of the staff is in a problem. The staff is in specified in the staff is in the staff in the staff is in the staff in the staff is in the staff in the staff in the staff is the staff in the staff in the staff in the staff is the staff in the staff

the average distance marched per month by our troops for the last year with that of the Rebels, or with European armies in the field, we will see why our troops march no bet-ter. They are not sufficiently exercised to make them good and efficient soldiers."

On the 1st of October Gen. McClellan asked for authority to build a double-track suspension bridge and a permanent wagon bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, which Gen. Helleck declined to give. About that time the President visited the army. After his return to Washington the following order was sent to Gen. McClellan by Gen. Halleck:

M'CLELLAN ORDERED TO MOVE.

"Vashington, D. C., Oct. 6, 1862.)
"I am instructed to telegrath you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South. Your army must move now with she readers a

dent directs that your army many while the rouds are good.

"Hyou cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the tater by your line of operations, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 mm. If you move up the valley of the Shenandouh, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the int-rior line between the control of the shear and the enemy, but does not orderit. He is of the Shenandon, nor more than appeared by you. The President advises the int-rior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what time you adopt, and where you intend to cross the river; also, to what point the re-enforcements are to be 4 ont. It is necessary that a plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges or repairing railroads.

"I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concurvith the President in these lastructions.

"W. H. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

To this Gen. McClellan replies on the same day:

"It is important, in making my decision regarding the route to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, what description of troops I am to be re-enforced with upon what description of troops I am to be re-enforced with upon the Sheanadoah route, and also upon the other route between the enemy and Washington; whether they are to be old or new troops, or what proportion of each. If possible, I should be glad to have Peck's division sent to me, if it can be got here within a reasonable time.

"Second. Will you inform me what the present condition of the Alexandria and Leashurg Failroad is: also the Meanages

"Second. Will you inform me what the present condution of the Alexandria and Leesburg Railroad is; also the Manassas Gap Railroad; and what time it would require to put them in working order? It is believed that the Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad is not materially injured."

To this Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th:

"The Manassas Gap Road can be repaired in a few days. The Leesburg Road is much more injured. You can reach the former in less time than would be required to repair the latter. The troops to be sent you will be partly new and partly old-mostly new."

HIS PLANS AND FEARS.

On the same day Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

On the same day Gen. McCleflan telegraphs:

"After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for immediate operations against the enemy now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and Fannsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement

be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement between the Sheuandesh and Washington.

"I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Sheuandesh Valley as important for ulterior objects. It is important only so long as the enemy remains near Winchester. And we cannot follow that line far beyond that point, simply because the country is destitute of supplies, and we have not sufficient means of transportation to enable us to advance more than 20 or 35 miles beyond a railroad or cand terminus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fail back upon Stannton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that route, and we must then take a new line of operations based upon water or railway communication.

route, and we must then take a new line of operations based upon water or railway communication.

"The only passible object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat, we have nothing to gan by pursuing them, and, in fact, cannot do so to any great distance. The objects I proposed to myself are—to fight the enemy, if they remain near Winchester; or, failing in that, to lore them to abandon the Valley of the Shemardonh, there to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shallstrike at the heart of the Rebellion of "I have taken at I possible measures to insure the most compt equipment of the troops. But, from all that I can str., it will be at least three days before the first, fith, and str., it will be at least three days before the first, fith, and str., it will be at least three days before the first, fith, and str., as where sheles tent, as "I be go assure you that not an hour "all be lost in carrylug your instructions into effect.

"Please send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. would prefer that the new regiments be sent as regiments, not brigaded, unless already done so with old troops. I would again ask for Peckl's division, and, if possible, Heintzelman's corps. If the enemy give fight near Winch-ster, it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our resources. I hope that no time will be lost in sending forward the re-enforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible."

STUART'S CAVALRY RAID.

On the 10th of October the Rebel General, Stuart, made Lis raid into Pennsylvania, returning into Virginia, having made the entire circuit of our army. On the 13th Gen. McClelkan reported to Gen. Halleck the result of the raid, and ascribed its success to the deficiency of our cavalry, and arged "the imperative necessity of at once supplying this army, including the command of Gen. Banks, with a sufficient number of horses to remount every dismounted cavalry soldier within the shortest possible time. If this is not done we shall be constantly exposed to Rebel cavalry raids."
To this Gen. Halleck replies: "Your telegram of

7 p. m. yesterday is just received. As I have already informed you, the Government has been and is making every possible effort to increase the cavalry force. Remounts are sent to you as rapidly as they can be procured. The President has read your telcgram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would not be so likely to make raids north of it."

THE PRESIDENT TO M'CLELLAN.

On the 13th of October the President wrote to Gen. McClellan concerning the operations of the army. And on the 17th of October Gen. McClellan wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the reply of Gen. McClellan are as follows;

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Oct. 13, 1862. "My Dear Sut: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in

prowess, and act upon the claim?

"As I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpepper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of Autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.

"Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as vou know, is, 'to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own. You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond withm the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.

" Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the are of a circle, while yours is the chord. The reads are as good on yours as on his.

"You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenundoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this

would at once menace the enemy's communications. which I would seize if he would permit. If he holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I try to beat that to inclusional on the inclusion cause. I say 'try;' if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would light him there, on the idea that if we cannot heat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simulo truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a In coming to us, he tenders us an advanmoment. tage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, be again being within the intrenchments of Rich-

"Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side, away from the enemy, is remarkable, as it were by the different spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub toward the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chordline, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and inally the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Man-assas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five, and Thorn-ton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to ton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When, at length, running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way; if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order. " A. LINCOLN.

"Yours, truly,
"Maj.-Gen. MCCLELLAN."

mond.

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP IN PLEASANT VALLEY, Oct. 17, 1862.
"Sir; Your letter of the 13th inst. reached me yesterday

morning, by the hands of Col. Perkins.

"I had sent our strong reconnoissances, early in the morning, in the direction of Charlestown, Leetown, &c., and, as sharp artillery firing was heard, I felt it incumbent to go to the front. I did not leave Charlestown until dark, so that I

the front. I did not leave Charlestown until dark, so that I have been multilet of give to your Excellency's leiter that full and respectful consideration which it merits at my hands. "I do not wish to detain Col. Perkins beyond this morning's train. I therefore think it best to send him back with this simple acknowledgment of the receipt of your Excelency's letter. I am not wedded to any particular plan of operations. I hope to have, to-day, reliable information as to the position of the enemy, whom I still believe to be between Bunker Hill and Winchester. I promise you that I will give to your views the fullest and nost unprejudiced consideration, and that it is my intention to advance the moment my men are shod, and my cavalry are sufficiently reno-

ment my menare shod, and my cavalry are sufficiently reno-vated to be available.

"Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a "Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a course which drifers at all from your views, without irst fully explaining my reasons, and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you.

"I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Major-General United States Army.

"Major-General United States Army.

" His Excellency the PRESIDENT."

MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS WANTED.

Gen. McClellan continued to ask for re-enforcements-for horses-saying that the issue to his army was only 150 per week; and for clothing, stating that his army needed shoes and other articles of clothing, and "had for some time past been suffering for the want of it," and that he was "constrained to believe that it was in a great degree owing to the want of proper action on the part of the Quartermaster's Department." The subject was referred to the Quartermaster-General, and he was called upon for a statement in regard to the matter. There was much correspondence upon the subject between Gen. Halleck, Gen. McClellan, and Gen. Meigs. The result of the examination is fully stated in the following communication of the Secretary of War, of the 27th of October, and the reply of Gen. Halleck, of the 28th of October:

M'CLELLAN'S MISRFPRESENTATIONS.

M'CLELLAN'S MISRFPRESENTATIONS.

"WAR DPPARTMENT,
"WAR DIPARTMENT,
"WASHINGTON CITY, Oct. 27, 1262. }

"GENERAL: It has been publicly stated that the army
under Gen. McClellan has been unable to move, during the
fine weather of this Fall, for want of shore, clothing, and other
supplies. You will please report to this Department upon
the following points:
"First: To whom, and in what manner, the requisitions for
supplies to the army under Gen. McClellan have been made
sline you assumed command as Ceneral-in-Chief; and whether

sluce you assumed command as Ceneral-in-Chief; and whether any requisition for supplies of any kind has since that time been made upon the Secretary of War, or communication had with him, excent through you!

"Second: If you, as General-in-Chief, have taken pains to ascertain the condition of the army in respect to the supplies of shoes, clothing, arms, and other necessaries; and whether there has been any neglect or delay, by any Department or Bursau, in filling the requisitions for supplies; and what has been, and is, the condition of that army, as compared with other armies, in respect to supplies?

"Third: A twint date, after the hattle of Antistam, the

other armies, in respect to supplies?

"Third: A twinst date, after the battle of Antistam, the orders to advance against the enemy were given to Gen. McClellan, and how often have they been repeated?

"Fourth: Whether, in your opinion, there has been any want in the army under Gen. McClellan of shoes, clothing, arms, or other equipments or supplies, that ought to have prevented its advance against the enemy when the order was

given?

"Fifth: How long was it after the orders to advance were given to Gen. McClellan before he informed you that any shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are his means of promptly communicating the wants of the army to you, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department?

"EDWIN M. STANTON,

"Secretary of War.

"Maj.-Gen. HALLECK, General-in-Chief."

"Washington, Oct. 28, 1862.
"Sir: In reply to the several interrogatories contained in

"Sir: In reply to the several interrogatories contained in your letter of yesterday, I have to report:
"First: That requisitions for supplies to the army under Gen. McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefa of bureaus here; that is, for Quartermaster's supplies by his Chief Quartermaster General; for Commissary supplies by his Chief Commissary on the Commissary-General, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the General-in-Chief.

"Second: On several occasions Gen McClelland and Chiefa the Commissions of the General-in-Chief."

graphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies Raphes to me the state was unity was united to retent a supplies. All these telegrams were immediately referred to the heads of bureaus, with orders to report. It was accretained that in every instance the requisitions had been immediately tilled, except one, where the Quatermaster-General had been cohiged to see from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing,

tents, &c., not having a full supply here.

"There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay in any department or bureau in issuing all supplies asked for by Gen. McClellan, or by the officers of his staff. Delays I avo eccasionally occurred in forwarding supstar. Decays tave occasionary occurred in lorwarding sup-plies by rail, on no-count of the crewded condition of the de-poter of a want of ears; but whenever nothiod of this, agents have been sent cut to remove the difficulty. Under the ex-cellent superintendence of Gen. Haupt 1 think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than it wind have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is went with freight trains. Any army of the size of that ef Gen. McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of no lect in main; timely requisitions, and unavoidable delays in forwarding them, and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of the opinion that the requisitions in the transportant of the opinion that the requisitions are not at a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the West. The latter have openated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far I've abenties for transportation. In how, I believe that no armies in the world, while in campain, have been more promity or better supplied. in campaign, have been more promitly or better supplied

than ours.

"Third: Soon after the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements.

to offerthat, if he moved between the enemy and Washington the theremen's could be sent from this place. On the lift of a cober, incling that he proposed to operate from their place is the tender, the sent has been the compared to the control from the proposed to the control from the proposed that it to the can may pointing out to him the Consequence in the aire of the may, because in the proposed that it is the proposed to the control from the proposed to cross the Poton act and give buttle to the chemy, or drawel immonth. Four athey may move how while the reads one pool? It will be obtained that three weeks have of pred since this order was given.

"Fourthat a may under G in the follows a prevent his compilers in the aimy under G in the follows prevent his compiler which the orders to have the compilered have been convibilities and to the southhold of the Potomar Le could have be convet his capplies almost as reading as, by remaining finetive, or national history.

"Fight On the 7th of Cobber, in a telegram in regard to the fine the count of move on the sone." to or tell at, if he moved between the enemy and Washing-

ince two mass not hisses.

"Proble on the 5th of Gebber, in a felegram in regard to his intended on the 5th of Gebber, in a felegram in regard to his intended thou ments a fee. If Clelan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the First, Fifth and South Gorpe, that they account a look and other indispensable article of clothing, as well as sheller tents. No complaint west in bette any in quintities had not been filled; and it was fact, direction of language that he was only waiting for the castifful for off in supplies.

"On the 11 hies telegraphed that a portion of bits supplies, and they right had been delayed. As arready that, the its very inexcept a supplies and they are supplied to the samed ing (had lith) he as had of in my of had, as all of a feet and they are supplied. On the latth, the supplied that the rate of supply was only 10 hours her well of the had on by foligae. On the latth, the supplied that the rate of supply was only 10 hours her well for the charge army, the only in frainfolf walls are a line should be Quartern tember end to had be into this in the rate of supply as a city 10 hours her west for the charge army, the only in the following walls to find a supply and the particular and the pa

here approximately for Pell Pro-Pytes, in nevert to Game (Minister) to the State and the engage into a fere asserted to the protection of the management of the protection of the management of the protection of "Or that the Gen. Fred FIRE Process in recognition for a long field of a confidence of confidence in the field of the confidence of the co

One of the ran received by him head like the rest of the range of filly, you don't at a wond.

Hen Elevis H. Stannow, but by the will be the factor of the range of the range

"Without more civilizations are communications from the racin of we much would be at the more; of the large cavalry close of the energy, and it would not be possible for Covery 1.16 of the energy, and it would not be possible for vylocover out finishing from 10 to out in the increasing in 1.1 mailtain of the position and inovenents of the county in 2.1 mailtain of the position in an inovenents of the county is such a way as to be sure an event of the county is such as the construction of the county is considered to the county of the county in the notation of the county is a construction of the county is constructed by the county is a construction of the county is constructed by the county is constructed by the county is a construction of the county is constructed by the constructed by the county is constructed by the county is constructed by the county is constructed by the

To this Gen. Halleck replace on the same day, at

3:30 p. m.:

Overteleman of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say that he has no change to make in Historier of two thin int. If you have not 1 + m, as due not 1 + m, in condition to by it, you will be able to so we such you will be able to so we such that the historier does not expect in possibilities, the tile very accident that all this good weather should be able to so the president of the p no, be wasted in inactivity."

On the 22d of October Gen. McClellan telegraphs: "After full consultation, I have decided to move upon the line indicated by the I're ader to have according to history, and have accordingly taken steps to execute the movement. I will inform you, from time to those, of the accouption of Leesburg, Intaba rough, Sackerswife, &c. I shall need all the events and other re-embreoments you can send mofrom Washington."

On the 23d Gen. Halleck replies:

"Should you move as proposed for your telegram of yester-day, I can send about 25,000 mea from Washington to re-on-farce you."

ABOUT CAVALRY.

On the 25th of October Gen. McClellan transmits to Gen. Hatleck a report of Cel. Robert Williams, command ug a detachment of cavalry, in which it is stated that nearly half his herses are unsound, from "sore tongue, grosse, and consequent luneness and core backs," and that "the horses which are still sound are absolutely broken down from fatigue and want of flesh."

To this the President replies to Gen. McClellan

on t' e same day:

"Here just real your dipytch thout sometongue and fationed have a Will you person use for as incover the horses of your many. Lawe some since the battle of Anticlan that ratifices anything T^n

Gen. Mculdlaureplies on the same day:

Chur, ly to your elegram of this date, I have the henor to state, I have the henor to state, I have the henor to state, I have the state and between store on the 7th of Sopre hen; I yet all yet a the yet a thinty englise interaction on the real section of the who that the Color on this way, which is now wing force the term is considered, which converting force the term is considered, which is now wing force the term is carried by the control of the control of the real section of the real section of the control of the control of the real section is the force of the control of the contr ing at a secondary 100 male set inversion shows the battle of Ande and and has male as part of reconsilistics changes rised that time, changing the oceany of every occasion, at displaced, is has perfect and lateral tensions of the factories of a stable state than before. It begans to my will also consider that the same eventy was brought from the predictable, where it one untered most laborious activities of displaced to the transfer of the statement of the present paging, in the constitution in the control of the present paging, in the control of the present of the proceeding that the production of the procedure of the procedu

since the baths of Artic and than obtained as of it?"

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corresponding to the start than I. Find, two considers
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tions to an in Sour Securally on a ched cans. I ving considers
whose more made do ratio on the perinsulated everywhose mediates. See hely, without a novement of our unity
be a relation to the carbing of inequals everywhere?"

MORE MEN WANTED.

On the S7th of October, Gen. McClallau telegraphed to the President:

"Your explicing is swyre of the very great induction of num." start has making presimined of the oding income of this animal, and how recessing it is not help the schole that a reptain and in the pulse schole that a reptain and in a result in the one of the received and in the oding in the oding income with drafted area may at one obeits und."

T. this the President replies as follows on the

eame duy:

same Cay:

"Yarthy a'ch of 3 p. m. of to-day, in regard to fling up old up finems with the still deco., is received, and the request them as I to complied with us thread the sec.

"And how fash a distinct unwartothe quasit at saft your property to go into action ground and the grand and the states are incomposated in the old regiments?"

The following is Gen. McClellan's reply—after referring to provious communications in relation to fill-

ing to the old regiments, Lee yes:
"In the press of Luences, I then called an aide, and te ling him I had conversed with you upon the subject, I directed him to write for one a dispatch, alway your excellency to have the reassary order eight. I record to see that this discontinuous given. I regret to say that this efficer, after writing the dispatch, finding the still engaged, sent it to the telegreph office without first submitting it to me, under the impression that he had communicated my

views. He, however, unfortunately added, 'before taking them into action again. This plus as was not suthorized or intended by ma. It has conveyed aldistinctly that I have not been as to my plans and distinctly that I have not been always describe the advance until the advance mail the clive needs as to my plans and distinctly that I have not being the advance until the clive needs are fill the the advance much the efficiency are all the drafted men. To minere discussing the array large Virginity estenday, and shall push flower has republy as pleasible to endeavor to a cet the change."

Your Commutee we [1819 that, it chell of edge.

Nour Commutee wo Itsny that, in their of adort a staff enter who could, from the distinct an either cause, and to a dispatch from the General communing an array to the President, that which "was not authorized or in ended," should at least be assigned.

to some o her duty.

M'CLELLAN TAKES FOUR WEEKS TO CROSS THE

POTOMAC.

The movement of the army across the river, which was commenced upon the field of October, continued slowly, until on the 5th of Tovember Gen. McClellan announced to the President that the list corps of his army finished crossing on the 3d of November, just four weeks from the time the order to cross was given.

In the letter to the President, of the 17th of Oc-

tober, Gen. McClellan writes:

"Your Excellency may be assured that I will not alopt a courso which differs at a litroit your views without first fully explaining my reasons and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you."

THE END OF M'CLELLAN.

Gen. McClellan was relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomae, in pursuance of the following orders:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
"WASHINGTON, D. C., Nov. 5, 1803.
"GENERAL: On receipt of the order of the President, sent "GENERAL: On rece pictible order of the Fresiden, sense herewith, you will imme faitly turn over your command of Major-Gen. Burnside, and repair to Trenton, bew-Jersey, reporting on your carried at that place by the graph for further orders. Very respectfully, your obe 'limb to, want."

11. W. HALLECK, Generatin-Chief.

"Major-Gen. McClellan, Commanding, &c., &c.

"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, & "WAR DEPARTMENT, ADDITIONAL DESIGNALS OFFICE, "WASHINGTON, INCV. 5, 1002. ("GENERAL ORDERS, No. 1.2.—By direction of the Predebt of the United States, it is ordered that Major-Green McChellan by relieved from the commend of the Army of the

Potomac, and that Major-Gen. Duraside take the command of that arm. v.

"By order of the Secretary of War.
"E. D. TOWNSE O, Assistant Adjutant-General."

OPERATIONS UNDER GEN. BURNSIDE.

Upon assuming command of the Army of the Potomae, Gen. Burnside at once determined to follow the line of operations which be had previously suggested to Gen. McClellan; that is, to make Fredericksburg the base of L soperations. He assumed ericksburg the base of 1.3 operations. He assumed command on the 7th or 5th of November, and on the 9th forwarded to Washing, or his proposed plan of operations. On the 12th of November Gen. Halleck came to Warrenton, and, with Gen. Meigs, had a conversation with Gen. Burnside upon the future

movements of the army.

Gen. Burnside stated that Lis plan was "to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Warrenton; to make a small more inset across the Reppa-hannock, as a feint, while a view to divert the attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe that we were going to move in the chection of Gardonsville, and then to make a ratif impressment the who's army to Frederichelong," for the reacontact "we would all the time be as near Washing, a as would the enemy, and after arriving at Fred ricksburg we would be at a point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if we should take Gordonsvile."

THE PONTOONS-WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR DELAY?

Gen. Burnside des red to have provisions un i forage, together with pontoons to enable the army to cross the Rappahannock. Gen. Meigs testifies that while at Warrenton he wrote an older to Gen. Woodbury, in Washington, to call on the Quartermaster at Washington for transportation for the poutoous to Aequia Creek, which or bridge. If alleck signed, and it was sent off to the telegraph. Like

C SUM PH LV12 VERRHOOW

Gen. Woodbury states that to recess to on the morning of the lots of Nov. He entermorning of the 1strof Nov. II : "G on II : Steelert massification is the test and the 10 his statement with the angle of the new of the 10 his statement with the angle of the 10 his statement with the angle of the 10 his statement with the angle of the 10 his statement with the test of the the test

HALLER SAYS HE WAS NOT.

Gen. Halleck testides:

Gen. Hallock testilies:

"I will stok the all the troops in Washington collissicity were under to seem and to fire, he can be allowed that you are to fire, he can be allowed that you are the fire allowed that one that of the can be allowed that you are the manufage efficient of Washington, with one says the fire in the form the fire of the allowed that not you she will be noticed in a the collissor. I washington until I was noting the fire in the form the fire that he form that not you she will be noticed in a the fire that he form the fire that the fire of the fire and the fire of the fire that fire the fire that fire that the fire that the fire that fire the fire that fire that the fire that fire that the fire that the fire that fire that fire the fire that fire the fire that fire that fire the fire that fire the fire that fire that fire the fire that fire that fire the fire that fire the fire that fire that fire the fire that fire that fire that fire that fire that fire the fire that fire that fire that fire the fire that fire the fire that fire that fire the fire that fire fire the fire that fire fire fire fire fire fire fire fi "I will state that all the troops in Wa hipston and they

"Question Vist the a top to pust 1, r y a to de 7 C. advices of the most until two boats arrived, or as planged that Kind?
"An wer. No. Sir. I remember this, that Gon. Woodbury, inconversation with may an 10. Con. I misside of directly the war resty the dynamic truth of the assumption of the property of the form of the following the fol

when he found Gen. Burnside was in possession, he would commence.

BURNSIDE EVIDENTLY WAS NOT.

Gen. Burnside testifies in relation to the forward-

ing of the pontoons:

"I understood that Gen. Halleck was to give the necessary orders, and then the officers who should receive those orders were the ones responsible for the pontoons coming here (Fredericksbure). I could have carried out that part of the plan through officers of my own; but, having just taken the command of an army with which I was but little sequainted, it was evident that it was as much as I could attend to, with the assistance of all my efficers, to change its position from Warrenton to Fredericksburg; and I felt; indeed I expected, that all the parts of the plan which were to be executed in Washington would be attended to by the officers at that place, under the direction of the different departments to which those parts of the plan appertained.
"Question, Did you or not understand that you yourself were to be responsible for seeing that those orders were carried out? I understood that Gen. Halleck was to give the necessary

ried out?

"Answer. I did not. I never imagined for a moment that I had to carry out anything that required to be done in Wash-

On the 16th of November Gen. Burnside started the columns of his army from Warrenton to Fredericksburg, not having heard anything of the delay of the pontoons from Washington. The telegram announcing the delay did not reach Gen. Burnside until the 19th of November. The corps of Gen. Summer was in the advance, and it was the intention that he should cross over to Fredericksburg and take possession of the place. But the non-arrival of the pontoons in time prevented the movement which had been contemplated, and necessitated the adoption of other measures.

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

Gen. Burnside then began to make preparations for another movement, bringing up the pontoons as rapidly as possible, to enable his forces to cross the

river;
The plan determined upon was to cross the river at two points; the right wing to cross opposite Fredericksburg, and the left wing to cross from three to four miles below the city. The left wing was composed of the Left Grand Division, with a corps from the Center Grand Division, making a force of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, the whole being under comand of Maj.-Gen. Franklin. The crossing was made successfully at both points, but with much opposition from sharpshooters on the right.

PLAN OF BATTLE. Gen. Burnside states the following in regard to

his plan of attack:

The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of "The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of hights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour around through a bad country. I obtained from a colored man, from the other side of the town, Information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to optian possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their line in two; and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of their works."

ORDERS TO FRANKLIN.

ORDERS TO FRANKLIN.

The following is the order to Gen. Franklin, who commanded the left:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, "December 13, 5:55 a.m. "December 14, 5:55 a.m. The watchword which, it possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.'

"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your redient servant, "JOHN G. PARKE, Chief of Staff." obedient servant, "JOHN G. PARKE, Chief of Seam obedient servant, "Major-Gen. Franklin, Commanding Department, Grand Division Army of Potomac."

FRANKLIN'S INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.

Gen. Franklin states, when last examined, that he received the above order at about 7:30 a. m., and that he at once took measures to carry out what he considered to be the meaning of the order, that is, "an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was." In his testimony, given when your Committee were at Falmouth, he says: "I put in all the troops that I thought it proper and prudent to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command, as far as I could, and at the same time keep my connection with the river open.'

FRANKLIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFEAT.

From the testimony it would appear that the attack was in reality made by one of the smallest divisions in Gen. Franklin's command-the division of Gen. Meade, numbering about 4,500 men. division was supported on its right by Gen. Gibton's Division of about 5,000 men. On the left was Gen. Doubleday's Division, forming the extreme left of our line, nearly at right angles with Gen. Meade's Division, and extending to the river. Just as Gen. Meade's Division advanced to the attack, Gen. Birney's Division, of Gen. Stoneman's corps, numbering about 7,000, came up and took position immediately in rear of Gen. Meade.

GEN. BIRNEY FAILS TO SUPPORT MEADE'S AT-

The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing the first line of the enemy, and gaining the crest of the hill. Gen. Gibbon, seeing Gen. Meade advancing to the attack, ordered his division forward. After his last brigade had advanced, driving the enemy with the bayonet, and he was preparing his batterics to open upon a Rebel regiment that made their appearance on his left, Gen. Gibbon was wounded and taken from the field. Gen. Meade's division having reached the crest of the hill, formed themselves in the presence of the reserves of the enemy, who opened fire upon them in front, and they also received a fire upon their flank. The superiority of the enemy was so overwhelming that Meade's division was forced back, as was also Gibbon's division. The enemy pursued until checked by Birney's division. Our forces continued to hold their position, without renewing the attack, until they were ordered to withdraw across the river.

The losses sustained in the attack, in killed, wounded, and missing, were as follows: Meade's 1.760; Gibbon's aivision, 1,249; Birney's

division, 1.76 division, 961.

FRANKLIN DISOBEYS A DIRECT ORDER TO ATTACK.

Gen. Burnside, upon hearing of the small force ordered to attack the enemy, sent an order to Gen. Franklin to make a vigorous attack with his whole Several of the witnesses testify that had the attack been renewed with all the available force under Gen. Franklin's command it would have been successful. Gen. Franklin testifies that it was not an order, but a request, and that when he received it it was too late to renew the attack, and therefore he did not do it.

Gen. Franklin testifies as follows:

"The order under which I was acting directed that the line of retreat should be kept open. It also directed that I should hold my troops in position for a rapid nareh down the Richmond road. I never dreamed that this was considered as a moud road. I never dreamed that this was common out strong attack at all, until since the battle took place. At that time I had no idea that itwas the main attack, but supposed it was an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy five at the common of the common o strengthened in this opinion by the staff efficer who brought

duestion. Did you not understand, from this order, that Question. Did you not understand, from this order, that you were to use all tho troops in cessary to seize and hold the Lights near Capt. Eamilton's, and that the General commanding considered that that was necessary to be done in order to

secure success

"Answer No; I did not. I should suppose that the order would not have limited me to 'at least a division,' as the wording of it shows, had such been his intention; and, besides, he directs me to keep my whole command in position to move

along the old Richmond read. If he had intended me to me my whole force, if unessary, to hold that hill, he hardly would have coupled it with the condition to keep my com-mand in readicless for this other movement. "Question. Was the other movement feasible until after the passession of those highest pour troops?

"Answer. I think that the other movement, if it had been ordered with my whole force, would have necessarily involved the possession of those highest. Itself been ordered to move my whole force along the Rehmond road, I should have been con-

whole force and a period of the found in the road, and a pelled to take all that would be found in the road, inghts would have been in the road.

"Question. As it was indispensable that we should have possession of those hights in order to move down the old Richmon troad, and as you were ordered to send out at least one division to pass below Smithfield and seize, if possible, those hights, did you not deem that the order required of you that you should, when repuised in the first attempt, renew the attack!

the attack !
"Answer. I think it did; but by the time the Rebels were "Answer, I think it did; but by the time the Rebels were driven back into the woods by Binney's division and Sickles's division, it was past 3 o'clock. It was dark, at that time, by 5 o'clock, and it was too late then to make such an attempt with the slightest hope of success."

The testimony of all the witnesses before your

Committee proves most conclusively that, had the attack been made upon the left with all the force which Gen. Franklin could have used for that purpose, the plan of Gen. Burnside would have been completely successful, and our army would have achieved a most brilliant victory.

After the attack on Saturday, our army remained in position until Monday night, when it was with-

drawn across the river without loss.

Your Committee have not considered it essential to report upon the operations of the right wing of our army in this battle, for the reason that the success of the movement evidently depended to a very great extent upon the successful operation of the left. Although our troops on the right fought most gallantly, making repeated attacks, the strength of the enemy's position was such that our forces were compelled to retire.

AFTER FREDERICKSBURG.

On Jan. 26, 1863, the following resolution was adopted by the Senate, and referred to your Com-

mittee:

"Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire whether Major-Geo. A. E. Burnside has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for the movement of the Army of the Potomac, or any portion of the same; and it so, whether any subordinate Generals of said army have written to or visited Washington, to oppose or interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been arrested or interfored with, and if so, by what authority." Committee accorded

Under that resolution, your Committee proceeded to take the testimony of Major-Gens. A. E. Burnside and John G. Parke, and Brig. Gens. John Newton, John Cochrane, and William W. Ayerill. That

testimony brings to light the following facts:

BURNSIDE'S PLANS. Shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg, Gen. Burnside devised a plan for attacking the enemy in his front. The main army was to cross at a place some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. The positions for the artillery to protect the crossing were all selected, the roads were all surveyed, and the cordurey was cut for preparing the roads. At the same time a feint of crossing was to be made some distance above Falmouth, which feint could be turned into a positive attack should the enemy discover the movement below; otherwise the main attack was to be made below.

A GRAND CAVALRY EXPEDITION.

In connection with this movement of the main army, a cavalry expedition was organized, consisting of 2,500 of the best cavalry in the Army of the Potomac, 1,000 of whom were picked men. The plan tomac, 1,000 of whom were picked men. The plan of that expedition was as follows: Accompanied by a brigade of infantry detailed to protect the crossing of the Rappahannock, it was to proceed up to Kelly's Ford; there the 1,000 picked men were to cross, and to proceed to the Rapidan and cross that river at Raccoon Ford; then to go onward and cross the Virginia Central Railroad at Louisa Court-House; the James River at Goochland or Carter's, blowing up the locks of the James River Canal at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond and Lynchburg Railroad at a point south of there, blowing up the iron-bridge at the place of crossing: cross the Richmond, Petershurg and Weldon Railroad where it crossed the Nottoway River, destroying the railroad bridge there; and then proceed on by Gen. Pryor's command, and effect a junction with Gen. Peck, at Suffolk, where steamers were to be in wait-

ing to take them to Acquia Creek.

To distract the attention of the enemy, and deceive them in regard to which body of cavalry was the attacking column, at the time the thousand picked men crossed the Rappahannock, a portion of the remaining 1.500 was to proceed toward Warrenton; another portion toward Culpepper Court-House; and the remainder were to accompany the thousand picked men as far as Raccoon Ford, and then return. While this country expedition was in progress, the general movement was to be made across the river.

On the 26th of December, an order was issued for the entire command to prepare three days' cooked rations; to have their wagons filled with ten days' small rations, if possible; to have from ten to twelve days' supply of beef cattle with them; to take forage for their teams and their artillery and cavalry horses, and the requisite amount of ammunition-in fact, to be in a condition to move at twelve hours

notice.

GENS. COCHRANE AND NEWTON TRY TO PRE-JUDICE THE PRESIDENT AGAINST BURN-

SIDE

Shortly after that order was issued Gen. John Newton and Gen. John Cochrane-the one commanding a division and the other a brigade in the left Grand Division, under Gen. Wm. B. Franktin came up to Washington on leave of absence. Previous to obtaining leave of absence from Gen. Franklin, they informed him and Gen. Wm. F. Smith that when they came to Washington they should take the opportunity to represent to some one in authority here the dispirited condition of the army, and the danger there was in attempting any movement against the enemy at that time.

When they reached Washington, Gen. Cochrane as he states, endeavored to find certain members of Congress, to whom to make the desired communica-tion. Failing to find them, he determined to seek an interview with the President for the purpose of making the communication directly to him. On proceeding to the President's house, he there met Secretary Seward, to whom he explained the object of his being there and the general purport of his proposed communication to the President, and requested him to procure an interview for them, which Mr. Seward promised to do, and which he did do.

THE GENERALS PREVARICATE.

That day the interview took place, and Gen. Newton opened the subject to the President. At first the President, as Gen. Newton expresses it. "very naturally conceived that they had come there for the purpose of injuring Gen. Burnside, and suggesting some other person to fill his place." Gen. Newton states, that while he firmly believed that the principal cause of the dispirited condition of the army was the want of confidence in the military capacity of Gen. Burnside, he deemed it improper to say so to the President "right square out, therefore endeavored to convey the same idea indirectly. When asked if he considered it any less improper to do such a thing indirectly than it was to do it directly, he qualified his previous assertion by saying that his object was to inform the President of what he considered to be the condition of the army, in the hope that the President would make inquiry and learn the true care for himself. Upon perceiving this impression upon the mind of the President, Gens. Newton and Cochrane state that they basteucd to assure the President that he was entirely mistaken, and so far succeeded that at the close of the interview the President said to them he was glad they had called upon him, and that he hoped that good would result from the interview.

THE PRESIDENT INTERFERES.

To return to Gen. Burnside. The cavalry expe-

the synthete of he as Ford, to be a both and the synthete of he as Ford, to be a both and the synthete of he as Ford, to be a both as the synthete of he as well as a both as the synthete of he as a both as the synthete of he as a both as a both as the freedom of the synthete of he as a both as a

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THE ASKED OR ORDERS BUT GLTS NONE.

A correspond nee then took place between the Profit, General Lake and Gene Barnside. Gene Barnside de sheet authority from Gene Hallack, Gruens of each of the transition of the thousand to give it, to make a trovenent across the river. While unging the impact of the state of the care of the care of the state of the care of the state of the care of the state of the st portance and necessi y for such a movement, he candidy admitted that there was hardly a general efficer in the command who approved of it. While willing to take upon timesfull the responsibility of the movement, and promising to keep in view the President's caution concerning any tisk of destroying the army of the Potomac, Lo desired to Lave at least Gen. Halleck's sanction or permission to make the movement. Gen. Halieck replied that while he Lad

sdeam - invored a forward movement, he could not the the responsibility of giving any directions as to I w and when it should be made.

HE TAKES THE RESPONSIBILITY.

ment with at any further correspondence on the subject. He was un be to devi cany as promising subject. He was not be to device any as processing as the one just the wanted by this interference of his subordinate office as you are described me gave the ensage that the law progress to do. He, however, devised a plan of recoverant, and proceed a to put it in execution. As is well known, it was rendered a fortive in consequence of the save of our which took place should after the movement.

Emority after the movement to the an-Ger. Burn its states the plane the inclemency of the weather, there was the componental reason for about obligation may be peneal efficers against it. It, no of these one reflectly pave vent to their feel-ings in the presence of their interiors.

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THE PRISIDENT ROTUSES TO SUSTAIN BURN-

Gen. Popeliter also to Wa Magton and laid the a string of two years the following and he control over the following and he colors the following the first two sales of the following the first two sales of the following the followin hv.zers. To this Gen. Burnside replied that, if the relation than the for consultation, he would not be flowed to problem that order, and therefore a. a. d to lave Lis resignation accepted at once. The the President declined to do.

HOW BURNSIDE CAME TO BE RELIEVED.

ien. Darnside returned to his camp and came a to Washington that night at the request of a reclaent, and the next morelag called upon the I ent for his decision. He was informed that The charact declined to approve his order No. 8, but had concluded to re leve him from the elemend of the Army of the Potomac, and to export Gen. If which is place. Thereapon Gen. Barnside as an insisted that his resignation be accepted. This the r'resident declined to do; and, after some urging, Clea. Burnside consented to take a leave of absome for thirty days, with the understanding that ntime and of that time he should be assigned to ducy, as he deemed it improper to hold a commission as in jor-general and receive his pay without rendering savice therefor. Cen. Burnside objected to the wording of the order which relieved him from has command, and which stated that it was " at his own request," as being unjust to him and unfounded in fact; but upon the representation that any other order would do injury to the cause, he consented to let it remain as it then read.

The foregoing statement of the facts proved, to

gether with the testimony berewith submitted, so fully and directly meet the requirements of the resolution referred to them, that your Committee deem any comment by them to be entirely unuecessary.

CONCLUSION.

Your committee think it better to submit the testimony which they have taken in relation to the conduct of the war, without criticism to any considerable extent of military plans or movements, leaving each reader to form his own conclusions from the testimony, and such opinions of competent military men as it may contain.

As they look back over the struggle of the past two years, they feel that although we have not accomplished all that we hoped and expected within the time, s ill the great progress made gives us full

assurance of final success.

When the Government took its first active steps toward resisting the Rebellion the Rebels had been for more than five months actively and openly making preparations to resist its authority and defy its jurisdiction. They had usurped the control of the machinery of one State government after another, and thus overnwed the loyal people of those States. They had even so far control of the Federal Government itse fast to make it not only acquiesce, for the time being, in measures for its own destruction, but contribute to that end. They had setzed and taken into their po-session the arms and munitions of war of the government. They had scattered and demoralized the army, and sent the navy to the

most distant parts of the world.

There was treason in the Executive mantion, treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and the House of Representatives, treason in the army and navy, treason in every department, bureau and office connected with the Government. When the new Administration came into power it was necessarily obliged to adopt its measures with the greatest eaution, scarcely knowing triend from foe. An army and navy had to be created. There was scarcely a battalion of loyal national troops to protect the capital: and the first sense of security felt in the capital was when the volunteer troops entered it, summoned from their homes for its protection. At the same time it was with great difficulty that the loyal people could make themselves believe that any serious resista, co to the authority of the Government would be attemped. There were not wanting those who confidently asserted that it was but an outburst of disappointed partisan spirit, which they predicted would yield to an exhibition of force, and a determined and united spirit on the part of the people of the loyal States to suppress it. Instead of such an easy suppression, we have spent two years, almost, n warfare. We have thrown into the field a mil-lion of men. We have poured out our resources like water, and we find ourselves still engaged in the fearful struggle.

But the national cause is not the only one for which false autropations were formed—for which the present condition of things presents a striking contrast with the early visions of the supporters. Those who head, in Congress and elsewhere, the extravagances of the conspirators will know what veer disc, rhojes, what their expectations.

A speedy match up at the capital; a speedy overthrow of the legal Government; a speedy submission of a people to parillar inout to make an their rights; and a speedy subjection of the whole country to the assumptions of the South, were the prominent

features of their delusion.

The conspirators taught their people to believe that if war came it would not be on their sei. As yet, the loss its foot has sentedly tred the roil of a free Scare, and it is upon the seil of the States in open rebelion that the coltest has mainly been waged.

The Rebe's found themselves, almost without resistance, in possession of every fort and barbor on the sea-coast of the revolted States, except Fort Pickens, Persace in harbor, and the isolated fortilications and harbors of Tortugas and Key West.

They were, for the timo being, masters of the territory of the revolted States, of the depots, are nalls and furtilications of the Government, and had high hopes that all the slaveholding. Burder States would soon be united with them. To that that so many of these States hold to-day their true and loyal position in the Government demonstrates that true patriotism and loyalty is not confined to any section of the country, and gives full assurance that the Government will be maintained, its jurisdiction over every foot of our territory established, and our nationality vieldicated.

The events of the past two years are too fresh in the memories of all to require recapitulation.

WILAT THE WAR HAS ACCOMPLISHED.

Your Committee will, however, briefly calt attention to the fact that, from the commencement of active military and naval operations in the Winter and Spring of 1802, almost nointerrupted success for eight months attended all our operations, resulting in vast conquests. The triumphs of the navy at Hatteras, Port Royal and Fort Henry, were followed by the victories and conquests of the army at Mill Spring, Fort Donelson and Roanoko Island. Missouri was wrenched from the Robel grasp, and the Robel armies driven into Arkansas, where they were defeated in a pitched battle at Pea Ridge.

By the capture of Fort Donelson Kentneky was permanently redeemed, the capital of one of the largest revolted States seried, her great rivers hid open to our flo illis, and the war carried to the borders of the Gulf States. The Rebel stronghold on the Mississippi, Columbus, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, together with Memphis, the most important commercial city of the State, fell into our hands.

The autumn of 1861 had witne-sed the important capture of Hatteras and Port Royal by the navv. These successes were followed through the combined operations of the army and navy, in the Winter and Spring of 1862, by the capture of Rouncke island and Newbern, Beautort and Fort Macon, and by the reduction of the important fort, Puliski, controlling the entrance to the Savannah river; of Fort Clinch, controlling the harbor and railroad depot of Fernandina; of Fort Marion, at St. Augustine. the first-named operations we acquired control of the spacious inland waters of North Carolina (Albemanle and l'amheo sounds), and their adjacent spores, and of one of her two important scaports—Beaufort. By the last, we made ourselves masters of the rich sea islands and important harbors extending along the coast from Charleston to St. John's; leaving in the possession of the Rebels, on the Atlantic coast, but two harbors, Char eston and Wila ington.

But the brilliant triumphs of our army and navy elsewhere were surpassed by the capture of the great civ of the Gulf, the depot of the great Valley of the Mississippi—New-Orleans; an achi vement which, estimated by the importance of the conquest and the noble during of its execution, is scarcely surpassed in history. By this important conquest we obtained control of a large portion of Louisiana, and account ished the most important and difficult step toward obtaining the entire control of the Mississippi River, and crussed the surrender of the harbor of Pensacola, with the forts yet held by the

lebels.

In these hasfily sketched military and naval operations, extending in the West through the States of Arkansis, this ouri, Temesson and Kentucky, and on the Atlantic scatograffron Hatterus to Florida, and on the Gulf from Pensacola to the mouths of the Missussippi, we really really conquests at the test of tentals to the lot of the most powerful and wardske nations to make in so short a period of time. We pushed our conquests by land through Airsouri, Kentucky and Temessee to the very boundaries of the dull States; obtained control of the Mississippi the dull States; obtained control of the Mississippi River, except about 20 miles; occupied the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia—a large po tion of Louisiana; seized every important fort and barlor. In the Rebel territory, save three (Willington, Charleston and Mishka) which go to

corresponding extent the labors of the blockading squadron; captured fourteen permanent sea-coast forts, among which were the largest on the Southern coast, such as Pulaski, Barrancas, McRae, Jackson, and St. Philip. Following these conquests was the reduction of Yorktown and the evacuation of Norfolk, by which the waters of the James and York Rivers were laid open to our fleets, and the Rebels deprived of the facilities furnished by a great navy-yard, and compelled to destroy their only means of menacing our fleets in Hampton Roads—the Merrimee

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN.

Had the success of the Army of the Potomac during this period corresponded with the success of our arms in other parts of the country, there is reason to believe that the termination of the campaign of 1863 would have seen the Rebellion well-nigh, if

not entirely, overthrown.

Had Noriolk been captured during the Winter of 1861-62, and the Merrima taken possession of or destroyed, the way to Richmond, by means of the James River, would have been open, and the ratal delays of the Peninsul avoided; or had the enemy, when at Manassas, some time during the Autum of 1861 or Winter of 1861-62, have been compelled to come out from his intrenchments and give us battle, as he might have been, by threatening or actually interrupting his communication between Richmond and Manassas, on which he wholly depended for supplies—a line solong and difficult to maintain that we subsequently did not deem it practicable for us—we could have met him with an army greater than it was ever proposed to take against Richmond, and either have opened the way to the Rebel capital or made it unnecessary to go there.

In military movements delay is generally bad—indecision is almost always fatal. In our movements we seem to have too often forgotten that momentum is made up of weight and v.loc.ty; that the force of the blow may depend as much upon the celerity of the movement as upon the weight of the body moved. The world's history shows that the successful General has met his enemy the day hefore he was expected—not the week or month after. Some of our points of attack have been so clearly indicated to the enemy beforehand, and our movements made with so much delay and hesitation, that he has been able not only to fortify his positions and concentrate his forces, but even to call into the field new armies to meet us. At such points we have failed.

It is particularly worthy of note that, in the reverses which followed the failure of the Peniusula campaign, at the time when the army of the Robels had reached its greatest strength and its highest state of enthusiasm, they did not permanently regain any territory or recapture and hold any of the important or controlling points before held by us on Robel soil. Their marches upon Washington, Maryland, and also Louisville, were little more than raids, from which they were obliged to retire before our opposing forces. This fact clearly shows that while it is impossible for us to constantly retain military possession of all the vast Robel territory over which we may be called upon to pass in our operations against their armies, still the territory once held or occupied by us can not be permanently regained by them—a sure indication of our ultimate success.

The past, notwitostanding its errors and reverses, is full of encouragement, and gives full assurance of final success. No great war was ever conducted by any people or Covernment without great mistakes—giving to the critice of the time and those of enceeding generations a wide and ample field for their labors. No people on earth were ever called suddarly into a great war more totally unprepared than were the loyal people of this Government. We felt so well assured of our position among the powers of the world that we had almost concluded we had fought our last battle, and our army and navy had come to be regarded by many as useless appendages to the Government. We had concluded that, doing justice to the nations of the world, we should receive justice in return; and the loyal portion of the

people were devoting all their energies and powers to the arts of peace, the advancement of civilization, the development of the rich and varied resources of our new and great country; and in these every man found full occupation for his talents and a wide field for his ambition—no man ever dreaming that the parricidal arm would ever be raised against a Government so mild in its sway, so benignant in

its influence over all its subjects.

It was indeed difficult for a people thus engrossed, suddenly and almost without waining, to turn its attention to war. The Rabels believed us to be so entirely devoted to the pursuits of peace that we should yield to their demands rather than be diverted from them; and hence their nefarious attempt to overthrow this fair Government, erect on its ruins that horrid deformity, a free Government with human Slavery for its corner-stone. How terribly they have been mistaken, the past has already shown; and yet the energies and powers and resources of the loyal people have hardly be-gun to be applied to the suppression of the Re-bellion. They must meet and contend in battle with that strength and power and intelligence which has built factories and workshops, railroads and steamboats, covered the ocean with ships, and filled the markets of the world with the product of its brain and hands; and they will find these no less powerful for destruction than for production, when once fully applied in that direction.

All the great industrial interests of the loyal States were never more active, more prosperous, than at this time. All that has been lost by the supply of men to the army has been made up by increased activity and energy, and the adaptation of machinery to work heretofore done by the human hand. There is only this marked difference: heretofore all these great forces have been applied for the benefit of the arts of peace; now they all look primarily to the prosecution of war; and years would have to elapse—far more than would be required to crush out the Rebellion—before we should

develop our full strength for war.

Within less than two years we have thrown into and sustained in the field an army of a million of men. We have created a navy with which we have blockaded a coast greater in extent than was ever attempted by any Government before, and by our inventions and improvements so completely revolutionized naval warfare as to render the navies and sea-coast defenses of the world well nigh useless.

The efficiency of this blockade is attested not only by the destitution of the Rebels in every article of foreign production, but by the cry that comes to us every day from ull parts of the world, in any degree dependent upon the products of the blockaded territory, etimulating us to still greater exertion to crush out this Rebellion, that the blockaded ports may be thrown open to the legitimate commerce of the world.

And while, in our efforts to maintain our Government and vindcate free institutions, we neither asked nor desired the aid of any foreign nation or Government, we did at least expect of the leading Powers of Europe that they should refrain from extending aid and encouragement to a Rebellion against a friendly Government, thereby prolonging a struggle which can only bring misery and suffering upon the whole civilized world, and may in the end lead to a war between our Government and some of those Powers, the full effects of which the future alone can oisclose.

OUR RESOURCES.

We have carried on, shall carry on and conclude this war, without touch ng one dollar of the accumulated capital of the country. We are already astonished at the revenue now being raised from the taxation of our daily productions, and yet we do not begin to realize the amount to be yielded by the spetm already adopted, or the extent to which that system may be enlarged, without imposing any grievous burdens upon the people—any burden to which they will not cheerfully submit to accomplish the object intended.

No Government can long carry on a war which

must be sustained by the accumulated capital of the country, and there is scarcely a limit to the time war may be prosecuted by a Government whose credit is sustained by the revenues derived from the accumulating wealth of the country.

REBEL DEFICIENCIES.

Every dollar the Rebels have expended or can expend in this Rebellion has heen and must continue to be drawn from their accumulated capital. Their intercourse with foreign nations has been almost wholly suspended, all their industrial interests have been paralyzed, and there is no source from which they can derive revenue or means for the maintenance of the war, except by depriving the people of their property, day after day, and year after year, so long as the war shall continue, thus reducing them to poverty and want. This is a truth which the people in the revolted States are already beginning to realize. They had been made to believe that an export duty on cotton, which the world would be obliged to pay, would yield them the richest revenue ever realized by any Government, and that if the Federal Government should attempt interference with its exportation, they could command the armies and navies of Europe to fight their battles for them. How bitter must be their disappointment as they apply with their own hands the torch which consigns it to ashes, and then are compelled to supply to their leaders, from their other property, the means to sustain the Rebellion! Their currency has almost ceased to be regarded, even by themselves, as the representative of value.

Conscription has exhausted their people, and the wealth which long years of uninterrupted prosperity under the best government the world ever saw, had placed in their hands, has already been expended, and they are now struggling on with the vain hope that dissensions among ourselves, or foreign intervention, may save them from that ruin which they see clearly impending over them. Every day must show them more and more clearly that on neither of these sources can they rely for help. The utter scorn and contempt with which every man in the Lyal States who proposes any adjustment of this contest except the absolute, unqualified, and unconditional subjugation of every Rebel in the land to the Constitution and the taws, is held by every officer and soldier in our army, and every loyal man in the country, must banish from their minds the last ray of hope from that source. The reaction which followed the recent slight manifestations of a willingness on the part of a few Secession sympathizers to offer terms of compromile must convince them that they have no allies in the loyal States on whom they can rely; and the present condition of affairs in Europe must forever crush that false and delusive hope which they have heretofore entertained, that the intervention of European powers might enable them to accomplish what they know full well they can never attain unaided.

THE TASK BEFORE US.

We now see clearly what we have to do. must obtain uninterrupted control of the Mississippi. We must reach those great railroad atteries —the one bordering the Atlantic seaboard, the other stretching through the Virginia and Tennessee valleys to the west and south. We must, as soon as possible, take the few fortified scapouts remaining in possession of the Rebels, cut it of from all external cources of food and arms, and have surrounded it by forces which can press upon it from any quarter, at the same time severing into related portions too Rebel territory and destroying their means of intercommunication, by which alone they have hitherto beca enabled to meet us in force wherever we have presented ourselves, and by which alone they have been able to feed and supply their armies.

By possessing ourselves of, and keeping open, the great natural highways alone (and a possession of a mavy by us should have early suggested this), we sever parts of their territory munually dependent, and, while cripping them, enable ourselves to speedly concentrate our forces at any point where

it may be advisable to strike.

These decisive measures we are actually executing or preparing to execute. The encesses and conquests we have already described have carried us through the prelaminary singes, and the blows we now sarike—each one of them that succeeds—will reach the very vitals of the ReLellion. Let any one east his eye upon the map, and these truths will be apparent.

It may be in the future, as in the past, we shall meet with reverses; they are the inevitable inci-dents of a great war extending over so vast a territory, and requiring great armies at so whilely sepa; rated points. We have already even that it is not our true policy to attempt for actual military occupation of the field territory, except at a few and important controlling a joint. We must destroy important controlling point... We must destroy their armies, and to do this we must concentrate, not scatter, our forces. It is better to operate successfully against one stronghold or one army than to attempt three and and. The indications now clearly are that, both in the East and West, the compagnof 1863 will give us bril iant achievement—decisive Our Generals now in the field have the victories. full confidence of the soldiers and the prople, and the armies will go forth, knowing that their ranks are to be made full; that every day that passes will add to, not diminish, their strength or numbers. Never before did the world see such an army in the field; never before did Generals tead such men to battle. Each man goes forth feeling, not only that he has a soldier's reputation to maintain, but also that he has a country to defend in which his interest is as great as that of the highest officer in the land. Such an army, with its energy, power, intelligence and will, properly directed, must be invincible. The past has already demonstrated that the true American soldier can be relied upon, to dare, do, and endure all that human power can attempt, accomprish, or sustaiu.

Let no men be placed or kept in command of such men who have not the ability to command and the will to do; thus the errors and mistakes of the past will be avoided in the future, the fond hopes and anticipations of a true and loyal people realized, the Government vindicated and rebellion speedily and

forever crushed.

We know that this contest has cost us and will cost us treasures and blood-the best blood ever shed by any people in maintenance of their Government and in detense of free institutions-the blood of the flower of our land. Let us not make their lives a vain offering, by for a moment entertaining the idea of a partition of our territory, which would forever involve us in anarchy and border wars, or by any base compromise with Rebels.

We owe it to the noble dead who have shed their blood in founding and defending this Government; we owe it to ourselves; we owo it to the countless millions who are to come after us, to maintain this Government and the institutions we have inherited from our fathers—the richest legacy ever bequeathed by one generation to another—and to transmit them to our posterity, if not improved, certainly unim-

In conclusion, your Committee will only say, that all the men who hold high positions in the army and navy, and have rendered valuable services to the country, with whom they have held intercourse, unite in the opinion that if thing, and only lighting, can end this Rebellion; that every trainer in the land must and shall be made to acknowledge and yield absolute, unqualified and unconditional obedience to the Constitution and laws.

And your Committee believe this to be the senti-ment, not only of the army and navy, but of every man in the country-traitors and cowards alone ex-

cepted.

B. F. WADE, Z. C. CHANDLER, On the part of the Senate.

D. W. GOOCH.
JOHN COVODE
G. W. JI LLAN,
M. F. ODELL On the part of the House,

LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL.

The British Envoy at Washington has hitherto had credit for a forbearance and impartiality with regard to our internal quarrel whereof Earl Russell has seen fit suddenly to disrobe him. The following dispatch, written by Lord Lyons to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 17th of last November, gives an edifying account of a visit by Lord L. to this city on the 8th, and of certain remarkable conferences had by him here with certain persons whom he characterizes as "the conservative leaders."

Washington, Nov. 17, 1862.

My Lord: In his dispatches of the 17th and 24th ultimo, and of the 7th instant, Mr. Stuart reported to your Lordship the results of the elections for members of Congress and State officers which have recently taken place in several of the most important States of the Union. Without repeating the details, it will be sufficient for me too serve that the success of the Democratic or (asit now styles itself) the Conservative party, has been so great as to manifest a change in public feeling among the most rapid and the most complete that has ever been witnessed, even

in this country.

On my arrival at New-York on the 5th instant I found the Conservative leaders exulting in the crownfrom the Conservative leaders examing intererowning success achieved by the party in that State. They appeared to rejoice, above all, in the conviction that personal liberty and freedom of speech had been secured for the principal State of the Union. They believed that the Government must at once design the convergion of the Convergio from exercising in the State of New-York the extra-ordinary (and as they regarded them) illegal and unconstitutional powers which it had assumed. They were confident that at all events after the 1st of January next, on which day the newly-elected Governor would come into office, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus could not be practically maintained. They seemed to be persuaded that the result of the elections would be accepted by the President as a declaration of the will of the people; that he would increase the moderate and conservative element in the Caoinet; that he would seek to terminate the war, not to push it to extremity; that be would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the people of the South, and renounce the idea of subjugating or exterminating them.

On the following mercing, however, intelligence arrived from Washington which dashed the raing hopes of the Conservatives. It was announced that Gen. McChellan had been dismissed from the conmand of the Army of the Possmac, and ordered to repair to Lishom; that he had, in fact been re-moved altogether from active service. The General had been regarded as the representative of Conservative principles in the army. Support of I im had been made one of the articles of the Conservative electoral programme. His dismissal was taken as a sign that the President had thrown bimself entirely into the acts of the extreme Radical party, and that the attemps to carry cut the policy of that party would be persisted in. The irritation of the Conservatives at New-York was certainly very great; it seemed, however, to be not unmixed with

constitution and despondency.

Several of the leaders of the Democratic party soughs interviews with me, both tefore and after the arrival of the intelligence of Gen. McClellan's dismissal. The subject uppermost in their minds while they were a reaking to me was naturally that of foreign mediation televier the North and South. Many of them ecemed to think that this media ion must come at last; but they uppeared to be very much afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident that they apprehended that a premature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the Radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and of thus defeating the reaceful plans of the Conservatives. They appeared to regard the present moment as peculiarly unfavorable for such an offer, and, indeed, to hold that it would be essential to the success of any proposal from abroad that it should be deferred until the control of the Executive Government should be in the hands of the Convervative

I gave no opinion on the subject. I did not say whether or not I myself thought foreign intervention probable or advisable; but I listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I perceived a desire to pulan end to the war, even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether; but it was p ain that it was not thought prudent to avow this desire. Indeed, some hints of it, dropped before the elections, were so ill received that a strong de faration in the contrary sense was deemed necessary by the Democratic leaders.

At the present moment, therefore, the chiefs of the Conservative party call loudly for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, and regreach the Government with stackness as well as with want of success in its military measures. But they reputate all idea of interioring with the institutions of the Southern people, or of waging a war of subjugation or exterming-tion. They maintain that the object of the military operations should be to place the North in a position to demand an armistico with honor and with effect. The armistice should (they hold) be followed by a Convention, in which such changes of the Constitution should be proposed as would give the South ample security on the subject of its shave property, and would enable the North and the South to reunite and to live together in peace and harmony. The Conservatives process to think that the South might be induced to take part in such a Convention, and that a restoration of the Union would be the result.

The more a gacious members of the party much, however, look upon the proposil of a Convention mere'y as a last experiment to the two posts lity of remion. They are no dual a well aware that the the enablishment of Southern Lines native but the the enablishment of Southern Lines native but they pore ive that if the South is so utterly about dethat no possible concessions will induce it to return voluntually to the Union, it is wiser to agree to separation than to prescente a cruel and hopeless w.r.

It is with reference to such an armistice as they desire to attain that the leaders of the Conservative party regard the question of foreign mediation. They think that the offer of mediation, if made, to a Radical Administration, would be rejected; that it made at an unpropisious moment it might increase the virulence with which the war is prosecuted. If their own party were in power, or virtually con-

trolled the Administration, they well to be if trolled the Administrate is the would refer if possible, obtained and is to when the chief for each to we must be that by would to produce acceptant of moderal actions if it appeared to be the only means of a fingurary to be a line. They would not into the great Powers of I mappeared by antispecial action to the great Powers of I mappeared by antispecial action to Creat Powers.

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
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